A New Path for Industrial Policy in Brazil

In recent decades, very few developing countries have reduced the income gap with rich nations, and those that have are either in East Asia or Eastern Europe. The successful “climbers” have prospered by integrating themselves into an increasingly globalized economy, gradually increasing the volumes and complexity of their exports. The “laggards” across the developing world have typically suffered from economic and political instability and shunned the competition of global markets. Brazil, the “poster child” for the laggards, has been stuck in a “middle-income trap” for over thirty years, caused by public policy errors resulting from political dynamics.

Since the 1980s “lost decade” Brazil’s politicians have pursued “distributional politics” aimed at correcting wealth disparities between regions and social classes. The previous model (like China’s current model), which for three decades (1950-1980) had been aimed at building mass production manufacturing and infrastructure, was largely discarded as inefficient and costly.

The new development model for Brazil, still very much extant today, has been driven by the “Welfare” Constitution of 1988 that imposed an extreme form of federalism which gives scarcely populated states enormously disproportionate representation in both chambers of Congress.

Unlike the successful economies of Asia and Easter Europe, since the 1980s Brazil’s industrial policy has been inward looking and aimed directly at achieving social objectives instead of economic results. The main goal of industrial policy has been to relocate industrial activity from rich states to poor states by providing abundant tax incentives to investors. The result has been the hugely wasteful Manaus Economic Free Zone and some uneconomic and nonproductive relocation of manufacturing facilities from the south to the north. Consequently, since 1980, Brazil has gone from being the prominent industrial nation in the developing world to a minor player undergoing large-scale deindustrialization.

The major winner from federal political dynamics has been the farm sector which is broadly diffused geographically in states with low population density. In this case the policies have led to massive increases in output and productivity.

In essence, Brazil’s farm sector is a disguised “Asian Tiger.”  Like in Asia, government support for Brazil’s farmers has been broad and extensive and consistent for decades. In addition to substantial fiscal, credit and export subsidies, the sector has benefitted greatly from the work of the national Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), which is widely recognized as a global leader in tropical agriculture research and has been instrumental in boosting crop productivity. Furthermore, the farm sector benefits from two more characteristics integral to the “East-Asian” development model. First, domestic competition is acute, therefore, even though state support is available to all, only the most productive farmers can thrive.  Second, because agricultural commodity markets are global in nature, the sector is export driven. This means that Brazilian farmers compete with American farmers and must remain at the forefront of technological innovation.

Unfortunately, the farm sector is not a good substitute for industry. In contrast to the job creation, work training and other multiplier effects that are integral to Asian industrial policy, the farm sector in Brazil is highly capital and technology intensive and does not generate many jobs or ancillary economic activity. Also, its success has significantly increased the commodity dependence of the Brazilian economy and led to a structural appreciation of the Brazilian real. Finally, this commodity dependence generates economic and currency instability which further undermines the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector.

The challenge for Brazil is to find new growth sectors which can secure sustainable political support and lead to productive investments that generate quality jobs. The markets are very skeptical that this can be done.

A brief effort at industrial policy during the first Lula Administration collapsed under mismanagement and corruption and was followed by an equally brief romance with neoliberal policies under Bolsonaro.

Lula’s return to power this year has revived talk of industrial policy in Brazil, abetted by a shift away from neoliberalism in the United States and China’s aggressive state-led push to achieve industrial self-sufficiency in all “strategic” industries. Unsurprisingly, given Lula’s track record, market skepticism is high. Initial signs from the new government do not give much hope. The best that the new administration has come up with so far is a hare-brained scheme to provide temporary subsidies for purchases of automobiles.

Any viable industrial policy will need broad and sustainable political support in Congress. This means that the benefits must be broadly distributed geographically. Unfortunately, Lula’s atavistic vision of development is rooted in the state-led, capital-intensive model of the 1970s (e.g. Petrobras leading investments in refining and infrastructure).

A better approach would be to focus on strategies that have been successful in other countries: tourism and “green” energy, for example. Building a national consensus with political support to provide long-term  incentives for private businesses to invest in tourism and alternative energy could set Brazil on a new growth path. Policies should be structured so that  investors face both domestic and foreign competition to weed out the weaker players.

These are two sectors that are labor intensive and with potential for broad geographical dispersion of benefits. Brazil’s woefully underdeveloped tourism industry can learn from countries like Mexico and the Dominican Republic. In the case of alternative energy, the policies pursued by the Biden Administration in the U.S., the roll out of wind and solar capacity in Texas and initiatives pursued in many other countries can be copied. The roll out of wind and solar energy in Texas is highly relevant, as Brazil has outstanding conditions  to do this, with many locations in poor states. 150,000 well-paid clean energy jobs have been created in Texas over the past eight years and the sector is growing fast.

Mexico’s Bull Run

Despite the antics, the atavistic fondness for state intervention and control, and the frequent attacks on both local and foreign business interests, Mexico’s populist leader Andres Manuel Lopes Obrador (AMLO) is presiding over the country’s best financial markets  in years.

AMLO can be credited for a sound fiscal policy and for letting the orthodox  Central Bank  do its job. This hasn’t resulted in better economic growth but it has allowed for a more stable economy than most of Mexico’s peers around emerging markets. However, the main cause for market enthusiasm seems to be the hope that Mexico will be a major beneficiary of  “friend-shoring” investments, as global manufacturers look for ways to diversify away from China.

The performance of Mexican assets has been remarkable. As shown below, the Mexican peso is the strongest currency in the world for the past one and three years,  periods marked by considerable chaos in currency markets in many other emerging markets

The Mexican stock market also has done exceptionally well, as shown in the chart below. The Bolsa is a top performer for both the past one and three years. For the past five years it is near the top, surpassed mainly by tech-heavy markets (U.S., Taiwan,  Netherlands, Denmark). This is impressive given that Mexico does not have a tech sector.

The current sectorial composition of the Mexican market relative to other markets is shown below.  A characteristic of the Mexican market is the high weight of defensive stocks, mainly consumer oriented telecom, food and retailing businesses. Unlike in most other emerging markets, the Bolsa is not dominated by state companies or mature cyclicals, but rather by well managed private concerns. The combination of a stable economy and well-managed private companies is a rarity in emerging markets.

The ten largest stocks in the MSCI Mexico index are listed below. With the possible exceptions of Banorte and Cemex, these are profitable world class companies with dominant market positions, all trading at near all-time high stock prices.

After this impressive bull run, what are the prospects for the Mexican market?

It should be noted that both the currency and stock prices started this run at low levels in both relative and absolute terms. As the chart below shows, Mexico’s Real Effective Exchange Rate was at historically low levels in 2019, and it remains competitive today. Over the past 20 years the peso has been managed like an Asian currency, for stability and export competitiveness. The Brazilian REER,  shown for contrast, is much more volatile, which causes havoc for managing the current account and promoting manufacturing exports.

 

The next chart shows that the cyclically-adjusted price earnings ratio (CAPE)  for Mexico was at historically low levels in 2019, and the PE ratio was well below trend. The CAPE ratio has now normalized but is still far from stretched.

Mexico’s CAPE ratio based on expected earnings for 2023 is currently at 17.2 which is in line with the country’s average for the past three decades. As shown below, based on historical returns, prospects for future seven- and ten-year returns are moderately positive.

 

Bull runs are not usually stopped by valuation concerns. Along with India, Mexico may continue to be one of the few large emerging market with a credible narrative and the capacity to absorb foreign capital. Nevertheless, in coming years, investors will need to see “Friend-shoring” capital flows go from hope to reality to sustain the Mexico story.

 

 

 

 

 

 

High Commodity Prices for Brazil Probably Mean Another Wave of Dutch Disease

It is an unfortunate reality that for most countries natural resource wealth is counterproductive. This phenomenon is known in economics as “Dutch Disease,” in reference to the Dutch natural gas boom in the 1960s which resulted in currency overvaluation, declining manufacturing exports ,  higher unemployment and lower GDP growth.

In the Post W.W. II period, which has been marked by declining trade transaction costs and more open borders, few countries have avoided the resource curse. Norway, having learned from the Dutch experience, carefully managed the windfall from its oil boom in the 1970s by creating a Sovereign Wealth Fund to distribute benefits over generations. The United Arab Emirates has also squirreled away oil income into Sovereign Funds which make long-term investments to reduce dependence on finite oil resources.

In emerging markets it is difficult to exercise this discipline because of weak institutions and the pressing needs of the poor. Rent-seeking elites, crony capitalists and corrupt politicians inevitably take advantage of this institutional fragility to appropriate a disproportionate share of the resource windfall.

Brazil is perhaps the best recent example of the curse at work. A discovery of very large offshore oil reserves in 2006 was expected to be transformational for a country with a history oil deficiency. Predictions were made for an expansion of oil production from 2 million b/d to over 7 million over the next decade. The discovery sparked a euphoric mood, and  investors and policy makers projected positive effects on GDP growth, fiscal accounts and the balance of payments.

Brazil’s oil discovery  turbo-charged the commodity super-cycle (2002-2010),  which was already underway,  causing  a positive terms of trade shock, currency appreciation, and a massive credit boom. Instead of saving for the future, the government dramatically increased spending on social welfare programs and public sector benefits.

Unfortunately, the commodity boom brought all the negative consequences which are associated with “Dutch disease.”

  1. Worsening governance and corruption

The commodity boom brought forth the worse tendencies of  Brazilian governance,  well described by former Central Bank president Gustavo Franco as “An obese state  fully captured  by parasites and opportunists always  fixated on protecting their turf.”  We can see how governance (government effectiveness), as measured by the World Bank, deteriorated in the following chart.

Corruption also reached unprecedented levels over this period, as measured by the World Bank.

  1.  Currency appreciation followed by eventual depreciation.  Instead of squirrelling away the commodity windfall, Brazil allowed the currency to sharply appreciate. International reserves were also increased significantly, but without sterilizing the impact on domestic supply, which fueled credit growth.

 

  1. Deindustrialization

The huge appreciation of the BRL caused an accelerated loss of competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, which we can see in the fall of manufacturing share of GDP and an accelerated decline in manufacturing complexity. The first chart below shows the evolution of manufacturing value-added  as a share of GDP for resource-rich economies  compared with resource-poor economies, highlighting that Dutch Disease impacted all commodity exporters. The next two charts also show the evolution of manufacturing by comparing economic complexity in Latin America and  Asia.

  1. Lower Potential Growth. The erosion of manufacturing capacity led to massive replacement of “quality” industry jobs with low valued-added service jobs, and, consequently, a collapse in productivity. Potential GDP growth was about 2.5% annually before the commodity boom and has now fallen to less than 1.5%. As shown below, over the past decade total factor productivity has collapsed in Brazil.

 

 

As a result of this aggravated case of Dutch Disease, Brazil is more than ever dependent on its world class natural resource sectors: export-oriented farming, and export-oriented mining. Both of these sectors are highly competitive globally but very technology and capital intensive , providing  few jobs (Vale’s enormous iron ore operations generate only 40,000 jobs in Brazil.) Paradoxically, Brazil’s  farm sector has similarities with South-East Asia’s “Tiger” economies. Like in Taiwan, Korea and China, Brazilian farmers have benefited from ample credit,  state R&D support and export subsidies.

Ironically, current prospects for rising commodity prices are not necessarily  good news for Brazil as there  is no evidence that lessons have been learned from the past.

Protest Songs that Rocked Latin America in 2021

 

In 2021, two powerful protest songs expressed the state of mind of Latin American youth with regards to democracy: one condemning its shortcomings; the other longing for its blessings and the freedom it brings.

I.La Democracia

Chile’s Mon Laferte expresses the frustration and disappointment and the feeling that democracy is really just another scam run by elites to benefit themselves. This is the spirit of the youth and probably the driving force behind Chile’s Constitutional Reform

 

Mon Laferte – La Democracia (Lyric Video) – YouTube

 

Tú no tienes la culpa de que la plata a nadie le alcanza ( It is not your fault that no one has enough money)

Tú no tienes la culpa de la violencia y de la matanza (You are not to blame for the violence and the killing)

Así el mundo nos recibió (So the world received us)

Con muchas balas, poca esperanza (With many bullets, little hope)

Quiero que todo sea major ( I want everything to be better)

Que se equilibre esa balanza (That things settle down)

Tú no tienes la culpa de que a los pobres los lleven presos (It is not your fault that the poor are taken prisoner

Tú no tienes la culpa que quemen bosques por el progreso (It’s not your fault that they burn forests for progress)

 

Y los de arriba sacan ventaja (And those from above take advantage
Y la justicia que sube y baja (And the justice that rises and falls)
Nos tienen siempre la soga al cuello (They always have a rope around our necks)

La vida al filo de una navaja ( Life on a razor’s edge)

Que alguien me explique lo que pasó (Someone explain to me what happened)

(Por la democracia, la democracia) (For democracy, democracy)
Me confundí o alguien me mintió (I got confused or someone lied to me)

(La democracia, la democracia)
¿Pa dónde fue? ¿Quién se la robó? (Where did it go? Who stole it?)

(La democracia, la democracia)
Vamos a tomarnos unos vinitos( Let’s have some wine)

(La democracia, la democracia)

Ahí tení. Para que te engañen (There you have it. So they fool you

 

Tú no tienes la culpa de que persigan a los migrantes I(t is not your fault that they persecute migrants)
Tú no tienes la culpa de la masacre a los estudiantes (You are not to blame for the massacre of the students)

De las promesas y las banderas (Of promises and flags)

Los caballeros se llenan la panza (Gentlemen fill their bellies)

Aquí te van unas melodías (Here are some melodies)

Y algunas rimas pa la venganza (And some rhymes for revenge)

Que alguien me explique lo que pasó (Someone explain to me what happened)

(Por la democracia, la democracia)

Me confundí o alguien me mintió( I got confused or someone lied to me)
(La democracia, la democracia)
¿Pa dónde fue? ¿Quién se la robó? (Where did it go? Who stole it?)
(La democracia, la democracia)
Vamos a tomarnos unos vinitos (Let’s have some wine)

(La democracia, la democracia)

Hagan un trencito  (Make a train)

 

Make a train

Make a train

On this side and on the other

Dancing the cumbia they look prettier

Hagan un trencito
De este lado y del otro (On this side and on the other)
Bailando la cumbia se ven más bonitos (Dancing the cumbia they look prettier)

Hagan un trencito
Hagan un trencito
De este lado y del otro
Bailando la cumbia se ven más bonitos

Que alguien me explique lo que pasó
(Por la democracia, la democracia)
Me confundí o alguien me mintió
(La democracia, la democracia)
¿Pa dónde fue? ¿Quién se la robó?
(La democracia, la democracia)
Vamos a tomarnos unos vinitos
(La democracia, la democracia)
(La democracia, la democracia)
(La democracia, la democracia)

 

 

II.Patria y Vida

 

A collaboration 0f Cuban musicians, both in exile and on the island, in exile this powerful protest song swept the island (until it was banned) and the international latino community. It is a cry of despair for freedom and a denunciation of the scenescence and hypocricy of the regime.

 

.Patria y Vida      (Homeland and Life)

 

And you are my siren song
Y eres tú mi canto de sirena

Because with your voice my sorrows go away
Porque con tu voz se van mis penas

And this feeling is already stale
Y este sentimiento ya está añejo

You hurt me so much even though you are far away
Tú me dueles tanto aunque estés lejos

Today I invite you to walk through my lots
Hoy yo te invito a caminar por mis solares

To show you that your ideals serve
Pa’ demostrarte de que sirven tus ideales

We are human although we do not think alike
Somos humanos aunque no pensemos iguales

Let’s not treat or harm ourselves like animals
No nos tratemos ni dañemos como animales

This is my way of telling you
Esta es mi forma de decírtelo

My people cry and I feel their voice
Llora mi pueblo y siento yo su voz

You five nine me, double two
Tu cinco nueve yo, doble dos

Sixty years locked the domino
Sesenta años trancado el dominó

Bass drum and saucer to the five hundred of Havana
Bombo y platillo a los quinientos de la Habana

While at home in the pots they no longer have jama
Mientras en casa en las cazuelas ya no tienen jama

What do we celebrate if people walk fast?
¿Qué celebramos si la gente anda deprisa?

Trading Che Guevara and Martí for the currency
Cambiando al Che Guevara y a Martí por la divisa

Everything has changed, it is no longer the same
Todo ha cambiado ya no es lo mismo

Between you and me there is an abyss
Entre tú y yo hay un abismo

Advertising a paradise in Varadero
Publicidad de un paraíso en Varadero

While mothers cry for their children who left
Mientras las madres lloran por sus hijos que se fueron

you five nine, me, double two
tu cinco nueve, yo, doble dos

(It’s over) sixty years locked dominoes, look
(Ya se acabó) sesenta años trancado el dominó, mira

(It’s over) your five nine, me, double two
(Se acabó) tu cinco nueve, yo, doble dos

(It’s over) sixty years locking the domino
(Ya se acabó) sesenta años trancando el dominó

We are artists, we are sensitivity
Somos artistas, somos sensibilidad

The true story, not the wrong one
La historia verdadera, no la mal contada

We are the dignity of a whole town trampled on
Somos la dignidad de un pueblo entero pisoteada

At gunpoint and with words that are still nothing
A punta de pistola y de palabras que aún son nada

No more lies
No más mentiras

My people ask for freedom, no more doctrines
Mi pueblo pide libertad, no más doctrinas

Let’s no longer shout homeland or death but homeland and life
Ya no gritemos patria o muerte sino patria y vida

And start building what we dream of
Y empezar a construir lo que soñamos

What they destroyed with their hands
Lo que destruyeron con sus manos

That the blood does not continue to flow
Que no siga corriendo la sangre

For wanting to think differently
Por querer pensar diferente

Who told you that Cuba is yours?
¿Quién le dijo que Cuba es de ustedes?

If my Cuba belongs to all my people
Si mi Cuba es de toda mi gente

your time is up, the silence is broken
ya se venció tu tiempo, se rompió el silencio

(It’s over) the laughter is over and the crying is already running
(Ya se acabó) ya se acabó la risa y el llanto ya está corriendo

(It’s over) and we’re not afraid, the deception is over
(Se acabó) y no tenemos miedo, se acabó el engaño

(It’s over) it’s sixty-two hurting
(Ya se acabó) son sesenta y dos haciendo daño

There we live with the uncertainty of the past, planted
Allí vivimos con la incertidumbre del pasado, plantado

Fifteen friends on, ready to die
Quince amigos puestos, listos pa’ morirnos

We raise the flag still the repression of the regime to the day
Izamos la bandera todavía la represión del régimen al día

Anamel and Ramón firm with their poetry
Anamel y Ramón firme con su poesía

Omara Ruiz Urquiola giving us encouragement, of life
Omara Ruiz Urquiola dándonos aliento, de vida

They broke down our door, they raped our temple
Rompieron nuestra puerta, violaron nuestro templo

And the world is conscious
Y el mundo ‘tá consciente

That the San Isidro movement continues, since
De que el movimiento San Isidro continua, puesto

We continue in the same, security putting prism
Seguimos en las mismas, la seguridad metiendo prisma

These things make me indignant, the enigma is over
Esas cosas a mí como me indignan, se acabó el enigma

Ya sa ‘your evil revolution, I am Funky style, here is my signature
Ya sa’ tu revolución maligna, soy Funky style, aquí tienes mi firma

You are already left over, you have nothing left, you are already going down
Ya ustedes están sobrando, ya no le queda nada, ya se van bajando

The town got tired of holding on
El pueblo se cansó de estar aguantando

A new dawn we are waiting for
Un nuevo amanecer estamos esperando

It’s over, you five nine, me, double two
Se acabó, tu cinco nueve, yo, doble dos

It’s over, sixty years locked dominoes, look
Ya se acabó, sesenta años trancado el dominó, mira

It’s over, you five nine, me, double two
Se acabó, tu cinco nueve, yo, doble dos

It’s over, sixty years locking the dominoes
Ya se acabó, sesenta año trancando el dominó

Homeland and life
Patria y vida

Homeland and life
Patria y vida

Homeland and life
Patria y vida

Sixty years locked the domino
Sesenta años trancado el dominó

 

 

Chile’s Constitutional Trap

Latin America’s persistent economic decline relative to other emerging markets over the past 40 years can largely be attributed to poor governance. The region has become the main example for the “Middle-Income Trap” which results when rent-seeking interest groups institutionalize policies that make reforms nearly impossible in the future. Typically, these policies are introduced at times when social turmoil leads to “regime changes,” often through constitutional reforms. Brazil went through this process in the 1980s. Chile is going through a similar experience today.

Over the past thirty years, Chile has been the only successful major economy in Latin America. Until recently,  it was considered a serious candidate to join the club of high income and developed economies. However, inconsistent economic policies over the past decade and an explosion of social turmoil in 2019 appear to have brought about a regime change, which would reverse most of the pro-investment policies introduced during the military regime by its free-market “Chicago Boys.” A Constitutional Convention, firmly dominated by progressive and parochial interests, is now in session to define the rules of this new regime.

The example of Brazil should make Chileans very nervous. Brazil’s military regime (1965-1985) collapsed during the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s, a period  of increased political and social protest. Amidst this popular demand for change, progressive politicians filled the political vacuum left by the military. A Constitutional Assembly dominated by progressives came up with the “People’s Constitution,” which, according to its President, Ulysses de Guimaraes, would protect Brazil’s “suffering poor, massacred, humiliated and abused throughout history.” The new Constitution was a full rejection of the Military Regime’s trickle-down, investment-led approach in favor of one focused on securing social rights and economic safety nets.  Important interest groups with political influence, particularly civil servants, captured for themselves juicy windfalls. (One lone dissident voice at the convention, Senator Roberto Campos, a leading figure in economic policy during the military regime, decried the new constitution as “a mix of panaceas and passions…a catalogue of utopias… a civic Carnival… a hodgepodge of pettiness, xenophobia, irrational economics, corporativism, pseudo-nationalism and other foul “isms.”)

Very soon following its approval in 1988, more sober economists and policy makers began arguing that the Constitution – particularly its extremely generous provisions for civil servants–would prove a fiscal straitjacket and a severe burden on public policy.  For the past thirty years, successive governments have sought, with little success, to reform the Constitution to allow more flexibility in fiscal spending

One of the first critics was Raul Velloso, an expert on public finances with a PhD from Yale University. From day one, Velloso warned that the fixed expenditures mandated by the  Constitution  would prove catastrophic for economic growth. This week Velloso published an article in the Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper (Link) summarizing the consequences  of Brazil’s “Citizens Constitution.”

Since 1988 fiscal expenditures in Brazil have become dominated by mandated disbursements for social welfare benefits and civil servant salaries and pensions. We can see this in the chart below, based on Velloso’s data. Government expenditures have become increasingly channeled into constitutionally mandated social spending and civil servant benefits, leaving  scarce resources for anything else. The biggest victim has been investments, which according to Velloso, fell from 16% of the budget to 3%. Public sector investments in infrastructure have fallen from 5.1% of GDP to 0.7% over this period.

The lessons of Brazil are clear. Idealistic social mandates written into Constitutions during times of social upheaval have predictably nefarious long-term consequences. Once granted, benefits are extremely difficult to withdraw. Economic growth and prosperity lose. For Chile, Brazil provides a roadmap for what to avoid.

Emerging Markets Should not be Complacent About Debt

The  monetary and fiscal policies pursued since the Great Financial Crisis and greatly expanded during the COVID pandemic have repressed interest rates and flooded the global economy with liquidity. Low interest rates have promoted debt accumulation and stimulated a global yield chase. This environment has supported the widespread complacency of policy makers and investors who assume that these conditions are here to stay.

The fundamental argument of those who argue that the current mix of policies is sustainable is that low nominal interest rates and negative real rates make the burden of debt low by historical standards. The data series published quarterly by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) allow us to evaluate this claim. What the BIS data shows is that some important qualifications are in order. Though low debt servicing costs may persist in  the U.S., it seems stretched for many other countries to believe they will be so fortunate.

The chart below shows the latest  non-financial private sector debt service ratios for emerging markets as well as for several key developed markets. Private sector ratios are important as they are very sensitive to credit cycles and the private sector in all these countries is the driver of productivity and growth. The data for China may be less meaningful because of the dominant role of the state in the economy and the difficulty in distinguishing between public and private companies.

What we see is that these ratios vary tremendously across the world and within regions. The United States is in the middle of the pack, a comfortable position for the issuer of the global reserve currency and also the deepest market for “safe” assets. The countries on the left of the chart appear in good shape. On the other hand, on the right side of the chart there are obvious vulnerabilities. France is probably the weakest link among developed countries (twice the level of Germany though below Canada). In emerging markets, Brazil, Turkey and Korea are around the critical 20% level.

These debt service coverage ratios must be seen in the context of the recent wave of Central Bank tightening cycles that have been initiated  to confront rising inflation and capital flight. The chart below from Charlie Billelo details the recent wave of tightening measures. Both Brazil and South Korea are now in tightening mode but still have negative real central bank rates.

We should also be aware of the historical context. We can see the historical trends for each individual country in the three regional charts below. First, in Asia it is noteworthy that Korea may soon be back to the record-high debt service ratios experienced after the Asian financial crisis.

In EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa), the very high and persistently rising ratios of France and Turkey are noteworthy.

Finally, in the Americas the contrast is striking. Both the United States and Mexico have relatively low ratios which are very consistent over time. The U.S. is in a privileged situation as the recipient of global capital flight, and the Federal Reserve may be in a position to maintain negative real interest rates for the foreseeable future. Mexico’s private sector is underleveraged and poised to take advantage of growth opportunities. The situation is very different in Brazil.  Brazil has a history of high and volatile debt ratios. Corporate debt is at record-high levels at a time when the Central Bank may have to tighten sharply,  the economy is slowing to a crawl and capital flight is high.

The BIS data is a warning to not make global generalizations about debt sustainability. Arguments for Modern Monetary Theory, unrestrained fiscal expansion and financial repression may be justified for the U.S., but inapplicable for most countries.

Chile’s New Reality; from Tiger to Sloth

In the past, Chile was considered a rare economic success story in emerging markets,  in the same vein as the high-growth “Tigers”  of East Asia. After the neo-liberal reforms introduced by the “Chicago Boys” of the military dictatorship (1973-1990), Chile enjoyed high GDP growth and significant improvements in social indicators. However, in recent years progress has stalled and Chile has started to look a lot more like its regional neighbors than like an East Asia tiger. Moreover, this process of convergence with the region is expected to accelerate in the near term as a constitutional assembly approves a new progressive constitution that is expected to greatly increase social rights and benefits and undo much of the  neoliberal economic framework imposed during  the military regime. Undoubtedly, these important changes will impact growth and the investment environment. Investors would be negligent to not incorporate this new reality into their analysis of business opportunities.

Chile’s growth path has been on a steady decline. Following about a decade of spectacular growth (1986-1997) the economy has gradually lost its dynamism.  Even during the commodity super-cycle of (2003-2012), growth levels were a step below the previous trend. Like in the rest of commodity-producing Latin America, the commodity boom was more a curse than a blessing, leaving behind high debt levels, an overvalued currency and deteriorated governance.  Since the commodity bust in 2012, the country has entered a low growth path and faces increasing social instability resulting from the unmet high expectations generated during the boom years. The chart below shows Chile’s GDP growth path since 1980 and the IMF World Economic Outlook projections through 2026. The IMF now sees Chile’s sustainable GDP growth path to be around 2.5%, which is only slightly above the regional average and a fraction of previous growth. Moreover, the IMF’s numbers do not yet take into account the considerable economic disruption that will probably result from the upcoming constitutional reform.

The marked reduction in growth prospects for Chile will mean lower corporate profit growth and impact  stock market valuations.  We can look at history to put this in context.

The first chart below shows the performance of stocks on the Santiago exchange for the very long term (1894-2021). We can see a long decline from the 1890s through 1960, and then a more precipitous decline caused by the political agitation of the 1960s and the rise to power in 1970 of the socialist,  Salvador Allende. The concurrence of the military coup in 1973 and a boom in commodity prices led to a huge stock market rally in the 1970s, with the index rising by 125 times (a dollar invested in 1970 would have appreciated to 125 dollars in 1980). Then came the collapse in  commodity prices and the Latin American debt crisis, and the market lost 86% of its value before stabilizing in December 1984. From that low point the market would rally 33.5x before topping in July 1995. In retrospect, we can say that 1995 was the glorious peak for Chilean stocks. The stock market provided dollarized annualized returns of 39.6% between 1973 and 1994. Between 1994 and today annualized returns have been a measly 1.9% (These numbers are before dividends which increase returns by about 2% per year). About 70% of contributors to the Chilean Pension fund system joined after 1994 and therefore have experienced low returns on their investments in Chilean stocks.

The following chart shows the more recent performance in greater detail. We can see that the 1994 peak was built on a period of rising earnings and rising PE multiples, with the PE reaching 26.4, the highest ever for Santiago. The commodity boom  bull market (2002-2012) was built essentially on USD earnings growth, a combination of corporate earnings and a strengthening peso. Since the commodity bust in 2012,  USD earnings have fallen by half because of a combination of lower corporate earnings and a weakening peso. Nominal USD earnings today are at the same level as 14 years ago.

We can shed more light on valuations by considering cyclically-adjusted Price-Earnings ratios (CAPE)  for the Chilean market.  What we see here is that Chilean stocks have had two “bubbles” over the past 30 years: first in 1994, based on the extrapolation of the “miracle” economy and optimism on the transition to democracy; second in 2007-2010, when the commodity super-cycle drove up both USD earnings and multiples.

 

What do these numbers tell us about future returns? First, we can see that current CAPE  earnings are about 20%  below trend. Second, we see that the cape ratio is well below the trend-line which is also in sync with the historical median CAPE for Chile of 17.9. Assuming a return to earnings trend in several years and the historical median CAPE ratio, Chilean stocks would have nearly 80% upside from current levels.

This is the normal analysis done with CAPE. Fraught as it is with problems, it does generally provide a reasonable indicator of return potential. But perhaps the case of Chile does not fit into this easy analysis.

First, the historical median cape may be distorted by two periods of extraordinarily high CAPEs over the 30-year period, during the 1994 and the 2007-2012 bubbles. What if current CAPE ratios reflect more realistically Chile’s current prospects of low growth? Second, perhaps the earnings trendline should be sloping downwards to take into consideration these diminishing growth expectations. No one believes that Chile can return to the kind of growth it saw in the 1990s. On the contrary, the low GDP growth expected by the IMF is in line with consensus and may even be optimistic if the constitutional reform is as anti-business as many observers now fear.

The fact is that a return to normalcy is a low probability scenario. Investors have the difficult task of evaluating what the new Chilean growth model will look like and project expected returns on that basis.

The case of Chile illustrates one of the characteristic traps of emerging market investing. Sudden and radical changes in political and regulatory environments can completely undermine an investor’s valuation framework. We are currently seeing this in China where regulators have suddenly put in question the financial models of most of the prominent tech firms. In Chile, the protests of recent years and the prospects of constitutional reform have signaled the end of the pro-business neo-liberal regime, meaning that the high valuation multiples of the past are probably irrelevant.

The Lure of Complexity Drains Pension Schemes Around the World

The debate over whether to invest “passively” through index funds or “actively” through professionally managed funds has largely been resolved in favor of the passive camp. Decades of empirical data have made the case for passive and the result has been the persistent growth of index investing for both individual and institutional investors. Yet, in defiance of this trend, the financial industry continues to create and sell trillions of dollars in increasingly complex products with much higher fees. These so-called “alternative” financial products have made huge fortunes for managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, and other exotic products. Unfortunately, by and large, they fail to provide value for the investors that have been lured into believing that complexity brings higher returns.

David Swensen of the Yale Endowment was a pioneer in the use of alternative assets. The good performance of this strategy in the 1990s and several books by Swensen lauding its merits attracted many imitators to the “Yale Model.” At the same time, the rise of low-cost index funds on traditional equity products drove the wily Wall Street marketing machine to promote new products with high fees. As a result, from 1997 to 2018 hedge fund assets under management grew from $118 billion to $3.5 trillion. Over the same period, the number of active private equity firms grew more than tenfold, from fewer than 1,000 to roughly 10,000. In the case of educational endowments like Swensen’s Yale, the average exposure to alternatives has risen from 12% in 1990 to 34% in 2002 and to around 60% of total assets today.

Unfortunately, Swensen was not able to sustain the high returns achieved in the 1990s, the “Golden Age of alternative investing.”  Ironically, the popularity of the Yale model may have been its undoing. Over the 2010-2019 period Yale returned 11.1% annually compared to S&P 500 returns of 14.7% and returns of 11.4% for a traditional 70/30 stock/bond mix. This is before the operating expenses of the Yale endowment which total 0.38% annually. Nevertheless, Yale continued to be one of the best performing university endowments over this period.

The most recent study of the performance of public pension funds and university endowments, “HOW TO IMPROVE INSTITUTIONAL FUND PERFORMANCE,” by Richard M. Ennis (link) describes how the Yale model has destroyed value for institutional investors. Desperate for higher returns in a world of overvalued assets and low prospective returns, these funds have allocated over a trillion dollar s to alternatives and have nothing to show for it. As a group, they would have been much better off buying a few Vanguard index funds.

Ennis’s  study of  46 public pension funds highlights the following:

  • Only two of the 46 endowments outperformed with statistical significance.
  • A composite of the funds surveyed underperformed by 155 bps per year for the 12 years ending June 30,2020, and the composite underperformed in 11 of the twelve years.
  • Alternatives, which represented 30% of assets, provided no diversification benefits, acting equity-like in their risk profile, with added leverage.
  • Poor performance is not tied to size of the fund. In fact, most underperformance was attributed to exposure to alternatives.

Ennis’s survey of university endowments identified even poorer performance than for public pension funds. This is remarkable given that the staffs of endowments are considered to be more skilled and are paid multiples more than the public servants that typically staff pension funds.

Here are the key findings from Ennis’s research:

  • Endowments with assets greater than $1 billion underperformed by 1.87% per year over the period and trailed the benchmark in 12 out of 12 years.
  • Alternatives represented 60% of the asset allocation of endowments, providing no diversification benefit but dramatically increasing costs. Ellis estimates that the fees paid to managers by these endowments run at about 1.8% of assets per year and explain almost all the underperformance.
  • The performance of endowments actually is overstated, since they do not include their own operational expenses in their performance numbers. In the case of Yale these expenses were 0.38% of assets under management.

Ellis estimates that pension funds paid around $70 billion in fees to Wall Street in 2020 all of which they could have saved by investing in low-cost index products. Endowment funds paid $11.5 billion in fees plus about $2.5 billion in expenses (salaries, rents), all of which they could have avoided by investing in index funds.

Ellis’s data on endowments comes primarily from the annual NACUBO-TIAA (link) study of endowments which reports on the sector’s overall results. Using this same source Fiduciary Wealth Partners, a firm that provides investment advice to high net-worth clients, has tracked the returns provided by the top quartile performing endowment funds for the past twenty years and compared these to returns achievable through low-cost index funds. FWP confirms Ellis’s finding that even the elite of the endowments have destroyed value. The two charts below show (1) the portfolio allocation of low cost index funds used by FWP and (2) the 10-year rolling returns of this model portfolio including all fees compared to the composite returns of the top quartile endowments. The 70/30 index portfolio has outperformed in every 10-year rolling period and by a considerable margin over the time frame considered. This is before considering the internal operating expenses of the endowments.

Implications for public pension funds around the world

The case of U.S. pensions and endowments should provide a good example for the world. The lure of complexity and the belief that sophisticated high-fee managers can add value after fees is as prevalent in public pension schemes in Latin America and sovereign funds around the world as it is in the U.S.

Ellis describes the situation of the public pension funds of the City of Los Angeles as a microcosm of what ails public pension systems around the world. Taxpayers of the city back six different public pension funds representing different groups (teachers, fire-police, city employees, water-power, county employees and state employees.) All these funds replicate a similar investment cost-base and follow similar “diversified” investment processes. The final result is an immense index-like fund with an expense of 1.1% per year. This cost, in the end is born by the taxpayer.

The obvious path for these public pension funds would be to merge and simplify their investment processes through low-cost indexing approaches.  However, this is difficult to do because of the resistance from the agents currently involved in the process: the managers, investment professionals, trustees and outside advisors that have a stake in the current system.

This situation of Los Angeles is repeated across the world.

An extreme example this is the Chilean AFP system of privately managed pensions. Designed by Chile’s “Chicago Boys” free market ideologues in the 1980s, the AFP model was based on the conviction that private competition would bring about a fruitful combination of minimal costs and maximum returns, to the benefit of Chilean pensioners. However, after 35 years of the AFP model we can see a situation similar to the one of the the City of Los Angeles. The system has high costs which hurt returns for pensioners; seven AFP firms compete for customers, replicating high administrative and marketing costs, for a relatively small pool of assets of $200 billion. The primary beneficiaries of the AFP system, as in Los Angeles, are the agents (owners of the AFPs, managers, administrators, regulators). Much better results could be achieved by a small committee deciding on a long term allocation strategy and allocating the system’s funds to index products.

In fact, there are a few examples of funds that have  followed the path recommended by Ellis.

One example is Nevada’s $35 billion Public Employees Retirement System (link). Unlike Los Angeles and Chile with their teams of managers, administrators, marketers and advisers, the CIO, Steve Edmunson,   manages the fund by himself. Following Warren Buffet’s advice, Edmunson shuns fees and practices inactivity. Nevada’s funds are allocated to ETFs and a few trades a year suffice to keep them aligned with the long-term strategy. With an investment staff of one person, Nevada’s costs are 5 basis points (0.05%) compared to the 1.5% average estimated by Ennis for U.S. public pension funds.

The Count of Ipanema’s Real Estate Fiasco

There are two streets in Rio de Janeiro that commemorate the passage of Jose Antonio Moreira. One is the Rua Barao de Ipanema in the neighborhood of Copacabana Beach and the other the Rua Conde de Ipanema in the adjacent barrio of Ipanema Beach. Not much has been written about this influential Brazilian businessman of the Portuguese colony who was active during the reigns of  Dom Joao VI , Pedro I and Pedro II. He happens to be my ancestor, and so I have  put together a short and sketchy biography which relies on public documents and family archives. His story reflects the modernization of Brazil in the 19th century – from a slavery-manned plantation economy to a modern industrializing nation. It is also a tale of poor timing in real estate speculation and the dissipation of wealth by idle descendants.

The trail of the Ipanema de Moreira family starts in the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil in the late 18th century.  Jose Antonio Moreira, the future Count of Ipanema, was born in Sao Paulo, October 23, 1797, the son of Jose Antonio Moreira (Father) and Ana Joaquina de Jesus. The family was of noble origin, from the Braga District of northern Portugal. Moreira is a common name in Portugal, meaning mulberry tree.

Jose Antonio Moreira (father) was a prosperous merchant in Sao Paulo with close links to the colonial administration.  He had a key role in developing Brazil’s first modern industrial enterprise, the Ipanema iron works (Fundicao Ipanema).

Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal caused the Portuguese court of Dom Joao VI to flee to Rio de Janeiro in 1808. Dom Joao VI immediately eliminated all existing mercantilist restrictions on domestic manufacturing and actively supported industrial self-sufficiency. Iron smelting was considered a high priority and an area of with iron deposits in the vicinity of the city of Sao Paulo was chosen as a site for development.

The existence of iron ore deposits on the Ipanema Hills in an area known as the Fazenda Ipanema, nearby the village of Iperó, 125 km northwest of the city of Sao Paulo, had been known since the early days of the Portuguese colony. The site chosen for the iron smelter was located on the Ipanema River, a tributary of the Sorocaba River, and was surrounded by forests which could be used as fuel for smelting. The area had previously been inhabited by Tupi Indians, who had named it “Ipanema,” a reference to a river that has its source there. Ipanema means “stagnant or barren water” in Tupi-Guarani.

The company was established by Royal Charter in December 4, 1810 as a mixed capital shareholder company, with 13 shares belonging to the Portuguese Crown and 47 to private shareholders, businessmen with connections to the court. Jose Antonio probably represented the crown’s interests and was a founding investor. The project was of keen interest to Dom Joao IV who enlisted technical support from Swedish and German specialists, and he is s known to have visited the mill on multiple occasions.

The Fazenda Ipanema Ironworks, known as the Real Fábrica de Ferro de São João de Ipanema, smelted its first iron in 1816 and operated until 1895.  A picture from 1890 is shown below.

The enterprise, which can be considered Brazil’s first modern industrial undertaking, included a dam and a 4-km railroad connecting the iron ore deposits with the plant. The area is now a national park and a popular tourist attraction. The structures of the mill are intact, as shown in the pictures below, and can be visited by the public.

The geographical location of the site is shown in the maps below.

Jose Antonio Moreira , both father and son, were actively involved with the Fundicao Ipanema.  The future Count of Ipanema, who will be referred to as Jose Antonio Moreira from now on, was involved with the Ipanema Fundicao from an early age, and he would remain connected to industrial ventures in metallurgy and metal-working in Brazil’s first wave of industrialization during the imperial regime.

From the time of the Fundicao Ipanema, the Moreira family remained closely tied to the imperial court in Rio de Janeiro. By the early 1820s, Jose Antonio Moreira had settled in Rio De Janeiro where in 1823 he married Laurinda Rosa Ferreira dos Santos, the daughter of a Portuguese aristocrat from Porto.   She was born in Rio de Janeiro in 1808 and died in Brussels in 1881. They has six children: José Antonio Moreira Filho, future 2 º Barão de Ipanema (1830-1899); João Antonio Moreira (1831-1900); Joaquim José Moreira (1832-?); Manoel Antônio Moreira (1833-?); Laurinda Rosa Moreira (1837-1920); Mariana Rosa Moreira (1842-?) and Francisco Antônio Moreira (1845-1930). (Francisco Antonio Moreira is my great-great-grandfather.)

Jose Antonio’s success as an entrepreneur and his service to the Imperial Court was recognized on numerous occasions with the highest honors:  Comendador da Imperial Ordem de Cristo and Dignitário da Imperial Ordem da Rosa (Commander of the Order of Christ and Officer of the Imperial Order of the Rose), 1845; Baronato  de Ipanema (Barony), 1847;  Grandezas de Barão de Ipanema (Barony Grandee), 1849; Viscondado com Grandeza  de Ipanema (Viscount Grandee), 1854; and Conde de Ipanema, 1868 (Count).  Jose Antonio’s association with the Ipanema Iron Works and metallurgy are made clear by the choice of the Ipanema name.  (Imperial titles of nobility were awarded on the basis of merit and service to the crown and. Generally, were not hereditary.)

 

The heraldic shields of both the Portuguese Moreiras and the Brazilian Ipanemas are shown below. Notice that both shields have the flourished cross, which in Portugal was the symbol of the Knights of  Saint Benedict of Aviz, an order of chivalry founded in 1146. The Ipanema shield also has a blue line with five stars (representing the Ipanema River) and a Caduceu of Hermes (wisdom).

 

In 1844, during the reign of Pedro II (1831-89), Brazil adopted policies to promote industrialization and the import-substitution of manufactured goods which included stiff tariffs of up to 60% on imports.  Prior to this reform, the country had relied extensively on British imports. The policy shift resulted in Brazil’s first wave of industrialization, which had as its leading entrepreneur Irineu Evangelista de Sousa (Visconde de Maua). Jose Antonio Moreira was an early investment partner and investment adviser to the Visconde de Maua.  It is clear that Jose Antonio put his court connections and expertise in metallurgy to good use over this period, and he coinvested with the Visconde de Maua  in steel, shipyard, banking, steamboat and railroad ventures.

Jose Antonio Moreira was the first president of the Banco do Brasil, a Visconde Maua venture that was crucially important in financing Brazil’s early industrialization and still plays a vital role in Brazil’s economy today.

Interestingly, in the Banco do Brasil’s founding charter documents Jose Antonio is described as a “national businessman involved in the business of ships and national goods” (comercio de navios e generos nacionais).

Jose Antonio also had business partnerships with foreign investors, including steel concerns in Belgium. From the mid-1850s Jose Antonio is connected to Brussels, and in 1860 his wife, Laurinda Rosa Ferreira dos Santos, takes up residence there. From this time, four of their six children are established in Brussels: Manoel Antonio, Marriana-Rosa, Laurinda Rosa and Francisco Antonio Moreira. Manoel remained in Brussels where he served a Brazil’s general consul, and his son, Alfredo de Barros Moreira, would serve as Brazil’s first ambassador to Belgium.

We have two portraits of Jose Antonio. The first is a sketch of him as a young man; the second, dating from the 1860s, shows him in his prime.

 

It is during the final phase of his life in the 1870s that Jose Antonio Moreira purchased an estate located some 12 km south of the center of the city of Rio de Janeiro. This area with more than 3 km of beaches facing the Atlantic is now known as the Ipanema Beach neighborhood.

The estate was purchased in 1878 and initially it was used as a country house (chacara). An artistic rendition of what the area may have looked like in the 1870s by the painter Eduardo Camoes  (b. 1955- ) is shown below.

The map below shows the estate in the context of today’s Rio de Janeiro. The chacara extended from  the southern tip of Copacabana Beach (delineated by the current Rua Barao de Ipanema) to the canal that connects the ocean with the Rodrigo das Freitas Lagoon and creates the division between the neighborhoods of Ipanema and Leblon. The property stretched into parts of modern-day Leblon, including the current site of the Monte-Libano sports club.

 

The land purchased by Jose Antonio Moreira was known at the time as “Praia de Fora de Copacabana,” which was part of a larger area called the “Fazenda Copacabana.” Most of the property was purchased from Charles Le Blond, a French entrepreneur who ran a whaling operation called “Alianca,´ and had secured a monopoly on supplying Rio de Janeiro with whale oil. Le Blond went out of business in the 1860s when the Visconde de Maua introduced gas lighting to the city of Rio de Janeiro, and this may have provoked the sale of the property.  Vestiges of Le Blond’s whaling operation include the names of the Leblon Beach neighborhood as well as Arpoador  (Harpooner) Beach at the easternmost point of  Praia de Fora. The rocky promontory which separates Arpoador Beach from Copacabana  played an important part in the whaling operation as an ideal lookout to detect migrating pods of whales.

The area was originally occupied by Tamoia Indians, and, briefly, in the 1550s it was the site of a French military outpost. Reportedly, an early Portuguese governor eradicated the Indian population by furnishing them with blankets infected with smallpox (apparently a common practice in the 16th century).

The southern and western parts of the “Fazenda Copacabana” also were widely used for large sugar cane milling operations and cattle grazing from the 16th to the 19th centuries in the area which stretches from Leblon to the Jardim Botanico. The eastern part of the Fazenda Copacabana (modern day Copacabana and Ipanema) were inappropriate for farming because of sandy, acidic soil (restinga) and, in the case of Ipanema, frequent flooding from the lagoon.  One of the few structures in the area was the Igreja of Nossa Senhora de Copacabana, a Carmelite hermitage founded in the early 16th century. The hermitage had a copy of a statue of the Virgin Mary from the Church of Nossa Senora de Copacabana on the shores of Lake Titicaca in Peru which was said to have miraculous qualities, and that is the source of the name of the beach.

In all likelihood, the purchase of the Praia de Fora was made as a farsighted speculative real estate bet. As a prominent businessman with close ties to the Viscount of Maua and the imperial administration, the Count of Ipanema knew the city’s plans for urban development. Central to this vision was the Companhia Ferro-Carril Jardim Botanico, a Viscount of Maua venture, that was planning to expand its tramway coverage to the southern beaches of Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, he was certainly aware of the mid-19th century European boom in beach resorts made possible by railroads and by a newfound appreciation for the health benefits of the sea. Unfortunately, the Count passed away in 1879, leaving the future development of the area in the hands of his eldest son.

Jose Antonio Moreira Filho was 49 years old when his father passed away.  He appears to have been a successful businessman in his own right and highly regarded by the Imperial Court, and he was decorated on several occasions:  Commander of the Military Order of Christ and  the  Order of Our Lady of the Conception of Vila Vicosa (the paramount award given by the sovereign for services rendered to the Royal House). He received his baronage by decree in 1885, and the grandeeship by decree in 1888. He married Luisa Rudge, daughter of George Rudge and Sofia Maxwell.  His father-in-law was Joseph Maxwell (1772-1854), one of Brazil’s richest men, founder of the Maxwell Wright commission house. This was a trading house with strong links to the American and British markets which was a leading participant in the coffee export boom and a facilitator of the Atlantic triangle trade (imports of grains and manufactured goods from America, exports of coffee and slave trading with Africa). The Rudges were business partners with Joseph Maxwell. Both the  Rudge and Maxwell families were originally merchants from Gloucester, England.

The only portrait we have of Jose Antonio Filho is the one shown below, made in the 1870s before he had become the Baron of Ipanema.

Jose Antonio Moreira Filho’s plans for “Praia de Fora” depended on improved access to the southern beaches. The estate had been accessed primarily from the sea by occasional tourists. This changed when in 1892 the Companhia Ferro-Carril Jardim Botanico inaugurated the Copacabana Tunnel (today known as Alaor Prata), linking Botafogo Beach with Copacabana Beach, and providing tram service between the center of Rio and the southern beaches. A tram line covering the entire extension of Copacabana beach was completed by early 1894.

In anticipation of the further extension of the tram service, in April 1894 the Vila Ipanema real estate development project was officially launched. The land holdings owned in Copacabana and Leblon were not included in Vila Ipanema, and may have been donated to the city or incorporated into other developments being actively promoted at the time.

The layout of the Vila Ipanema can be seen in the two documents below. The first, dating from 1894, is the original urban design commissioned to Luiz Rafael Vieira Souto who was the Chief Engineer of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro.  The second, dating from 1919, is from a marketing brochure.

Vila Ipanema divided the area into 45 blocks.  The standard block was broken into 40 lots, each measuring 10 meters by 50 meters. More than a million m2 of real estate were put on the market.

 The initial launch included 19 streets and two public squares (General Osorio and Nossa Senhora da Paz). Most of the street names honored family members, associates and political allies of the Baron and his partners. For example, the main road at the time of launch was the Rua 20 de Novembro (Visconde de Piraja), which commemorated the date of birth of Luisa Rudge. Of the original names few remain: Alberto Campos (brother in law) remains; Avenida Vieira Souto, in honor of the urban planner, still graces the waterfront.

Jose Antonio Moreira Filho had several partners in Vila Ipanema: Coronel Antonio Jose Silva, Jose Luis Guimaraes Caipora and Constante Ramos.  The Coronel incorporated land he owned in Praia de Fora into the Vila Ipanema project. In 1901 the shareholders of Vila Ipanema were:  Ipanema de Moreira family, 90%; E. de Barros, 6.5%; Coronel Silva, 3.5%; Ulysses Vianna, 1.0%.

Jose Antonio Moreira Filho’s luck seems to have run out in his final years. He was 64 years old when Vila Ipanema was launched and in bad health. Given his intimacy with the imperial court, the deposition of Pedro II in 1889 and his exile to Paris may have seriously undermined his business affairs. Surely, when the Count acquired the estate he had not countenanced an end to the imperial regime. The proclamation of the First Republic in 1889 was followed by political instability and economic crisis, and the flight of both human and financial capital. In the five years from the time of the coup-d’etat which ousted Pedro II to the launch of Vila Ipanema in 1894, the real, the Brazilian currency, lost 60% of its value relative to the U.S, dollar, and it would lose another 40% before stabilizing in 1899. The 1890s would also see the rise of Sao Paulo as Brazil’s dynamic economic center and the magnet for waves of Italian and Japanese immigrants.

By the mid-1890s almost all of the Ipanema de Moreira family was settled in Europe, either in Paris or Brussels. Brazil was far away and becoming a distant memory. When the Baron passed away in 1899, the majority control of Villa Ipanema went to Francisco Antonio Morreira who resided in Paris and had not lived in Brazil in 40 years.

 

The following account from Francisco Antonio’s son (nephew of the baron), Alberto Jorge de Ipanema Moreira, gives some color:

“In the spring of 1898 we travelled to Rio, my father, my aunt and I. My father and my aunt went to try to salvage what was left of a brilliant fortune. Their brother, the Baron of Ipanema, who was their proxy, was old and sick and his business affairs had collapsed. The only thing left were the immense land holdings in Copacabana and the “Praia do Arpoador’” now renamed “Villa Ipanema.” Following the death of the Baron of Ipanema, an agreement was reached with his heirs on one side and my father and my aunt on the other, that the remaining land for sale would be divided  so that the heirs would keep 35% and my father and my aunt would receive 65%. Though born in Rio, my father,  my aunt and my mother – she of English descent, Rudge by her father and Maxwell by her mother – had spent little time in Rio, having been sent at a young age to study in England. They had little notion of the assets they had in Brazil.”

Franciso Antonio Moreira, my great-great grandfather, was a bon vivant living the high life between Paris and Nice. He was married to Maria Tereza Rudge, the second daughter of Joseph Maxwell, and, presumably they both had inherited large fortunes from their parents. However, it seems that they lived well beyond their considerable means. More on this from his son Alberto Jorge:

“It would seem that this family settlement had been very favorable for my parents. It didn’t turn out that way; quite the contrary, they lived for the next thirty years receiving only crumbs. This great capital withered away, used only to cover the most basic and indispensable expenses. The lots in Ipanema sold poorly, and my father wanted to sell at any price. He was born a great lord, and had no notion of thrift. Very elegant and handsome, he loved sport, especially horses; generous and extremely charitable, of an uncommon righteousness, he saw no evil and was not made to manage a fortune.”

Francisco Antonio had six children: Alberto Jorge (Brazilian diplomat), Maria Luiza (my great grandmother who married Eugene Robyns de Schneidauer who was a Belgian diplomat), Leonora, Maria Thereza and Jose. All of them resided and passed away in Europe. The first photo shows him around 1900 in ceremonial Court regalia. The second photo is a family portrait taken in 1929, near the end of his life, where he is seated next to his wife in the middle, up front.

The following pictures shows Ipanema Beach at the turn of the 19th century and in 1930. Notice how poorly developed it remained in 1930, still marked by the characteristics of the “restinga.”

The sales of the Vila Ipanema lots were painfully slow, as no one wanted to invest in that “fim do mundo.” This was in part because of competition from developers in Copacanana Beach who offered plenty of supply with closer proximity to the city and public transport. Moreover, though both Ipanema and Copacabana were marketed as “healthy and hygienic,” Ipanema was plagued by mosquito swarms when the lagoon periodically overflooded.

Poor sales also were caused by the delayed expansion of the tram service, which reached the General Osorio Square only in 1902. By the end of that year only 112 lots had been sold, which represented about 6% of the available inventory.

Development expenses also ran out of control. Capital, administrative and selling expenses were still taking up over 60% of revenues in the early 1900s.  High construction costs led to the farming out of development work to a contractor in 1905, the Companhia Constructora de Ipanema, which did similar work in Copacabana and Leblon. In 1906, this company completed the embankments of the lagoon, providing a permanent solution to the flooding.

The table below shows the Vila Ipanema sales revenue stream from 1900 to 1930, by which time very few lots remained. These numbers are presented in 2020 U.S. dollars, adjusting for inflation and currency depreciation. The real lost half of its value over this period. The peak of sales occurred between 1911-1915, a period of economic strength and real appreciation. The evolution of the real from 1984 to 1930 is shown in the following chart.

 

Over this 30-year period, total Vila Ipanema gross revenues were $15.1 million (constant 2020 USD). Net revenues after all expenses amounted to $12 million, of which $6.5 million went to my great-great grandfather, Antonio Francisco Moreira. By the time of his death in November 1930, a small fraction of that capital remained.

Of course, in retrospect it I easy to say that this capital was grossly and irresponsibly dilapidated. Ipanema today is prime luxury real estate and a beachfront apartment on Ipanema Beach may cost 3 to 4 million dollars. Unquestionably, the best strategy for a long-term investor would have been to build a big wall around the property and wait.

However, the reality is that Ipanema remained a sleepy and distant neighborhood, particularly compared to Copacabana, until recent decades.  It was not until the 1960s that it received some notoriety as a fashionable destination. Since the 1960s, the social and cultural center of Rio de Janeiro has moved rapidly to the southern beaches, leading to huge appreciation in real estate.

When Antônio Carlos Jobim’s family moved to Ipanema in 1933 it was because his mother was recently divorced and could not afford to live in a nice neighborhood. For the same reason, a wave of immigrants settled there after W.W. II.  In the 1960s, Antonio Carlos (Tom) Jobim’s generation made Ipanema famous with the Bossa Nova.  It was from the terrace of the Bar Veloso on the Avenida Prudente de Moraes that Tom spied the “girl from Ipanema”, Helo Pinheiro, walking home bikini-clad from the beach, and the rest is history.

There are thousands of covers of Girl From Ipanema; the most recent from Anitta.

Astrud Gilberto Version

Getz Gilberto

Anitta

 

 

 

The Girl From Ipanema

https://apnews.com/article/anitta-girl-from-ipanema-rio-brazil-bb45163a74e7d47c23a38f09a4cbe1e3

 

 

Pinera’s Gambit has Caused an Earthquake in Chile

Politics are mainly about how to distribute wealth. In democracies, despite the lobbying influence of plutocrats, occasionally the people will vote for radical changes to laws and institutions to tear down existing structures and accelerate progress towards more egalitarian and socially progressive outcomes. This has now happened in Chile where the recent constitutional referendum and local elections have resulted in a cataclysmic earthquake for the conservative establishment.

In agreeing to a constitutional referendum, Chile’s President Sebastian had hoped to calm social unrest, under the assumption that traditional conservative forces would retain enough power in a constitutional assembly to moderate the result. The results of the May referendum have shown this to be a huge and costly miscalculation.

Pinera’s conservatives were obliterated in the election by an alliance of highly progressive candidates from the left, including traditional leftist (socialists, communists, etc…) and independents (greens, feminists, native Indian, LGBT).

This progressive coalition has a solid mandate to put a close to an era defined by the military regime of Augusto Pinochet, the “Chicago Boys” neo-liberal economic reforms of the 1970s and the conservative constitution of 1980.

The circumstances in Chile are reminiscent of the process that resulted in Brazil’s “peoples” constitution of 1988, with its 70,000 pages defining “citizens rights.”  The fiscal commitments enshrined in the new constitution have burdened the economy since then and are a major reason for decades of low GDP growth.

The Brazilian constitutional reform was led by leftist politicians who felt aggrieved by the policies of the military regime. Now, in Chile, the new wave of progressives are determined to do away with the legacy of Pinochet.

The primary grievance of Chile’s progressive is that the previous model was structured to benefit the conservative elite and its economic interests. Chile’s pro-business neoliberal model, which promoted open markets and low corporate taxes, will almost certainly be revised with a focus on social distribution. Also, Chile’s innovative privately-managed pension fund system is likely to be unwound and replaced by an expanded social security benefits.

The evolution of the private pension system over four decades of existence is emblematic of the sclerosis that came to characterize the Chilean conservative movement as policy makers came to be captured by the business elite. Initially considered a thoughtful innovation, the system over time has been ineffective because of high costs and low returns. The system should have been reformed years ago but was not. The final nail for the AFPs was the dismal returns over the past decade, as shown below.

In fact, much of what has happened with the AFPs and with Chile in general should be seen in the context of the aftermath of the commodity super-cycle which ended in 2012. Chile, like most commodity producers, underwent a typical boom-t0-bust economic cycle and the consequent “Dutch Disease”: first, financial speculation (e.g. real estate), debt accumulation, overvalued currency, complacency of policy makers; followed by over-indebtedness, currency weakness and capital flight. The bust-phase of the past ten years has caused a deep social malaise for a young and educated population with high expectations, leading to a feeling of disenfranchisement and the recent street protests.

The irony is that a new commodity upcycle may now have started. Pinera’s gambit will have been tragically mistimed.

Latin America: Before and After the Pandemic

Latin America has been hit  hard by the pandemic.  The region’s economic and social concerns have worsened.

Both cases and mortality rates are some of the highest in the world, and probably under-reported relative to many countries (eg Mexico).

The region was the epicenter of the pandemic from late spring through the summer (the winter region in the southern cone).

The IMF forecasts that the region will be hit harder and recover more slowly than other regions, especially Asia. This comes in the wake of a decade of economic underperformance.

The fiscal response has varied tremendously, as elsewhere in the world, depending on ideology and politics, not so much fiscal space. Brazil and Argentina, the two most fiscally constrained countries, have spent the most. Mexico, which has most fiscal space, has spent the least.

Fiscal generosity in Brazil created a financial windfall for low-income families which resulted in a financial and consumption boomlet.

In Brazil the fiscal response has caused a deterioration of public finances which is likely to have  negative consequences for growth prospects.

Brazil’s debt levels are very high given its history and volatile economy.

The pandemic is increasing inequality and social division. ECLAC estimates a 45 million increase in poverty (30% to 37.5%) and 30 mm increase in extreme poverty (11% to 15.5%).

Poor, women and children most impacted.  The poor cannot social distance or work at home . Poor children do not have access to online schooling.

All is well in the “elite bubble,” and the “Gig Economy” is booming.

The poor and the rich used to watch the telenovelas together. Now the rich are on Netflix, HBO and Youtube.

The region’s problems predate the pandemic. The region has been characterized by low and volatile growth, deteriorating fundamentals, and premature deindustrialization.

Latin America is the poster child of the “Middle-Income Trap”

Investment is too low to promote growth.

The region suffers from acute premature deindustrialization.

Well-paid unionized manufacturing jobs are disappearing, replaced by the “gig economy.”  Brazil is Uber’s largest market measured by rides. There are  3.8 million delivery workers.

Latin America has had a lost decade. Before the pandemic it was crippled by Dutch Disease (The Natural Resource Curse), which is caused by boom-to-bust commodity cycles and entails vicious asset, debt and currency cycles and tends to result in the weakening of institutions and the worsening of long-term growth. This was the situation before the pandemic.

Asset Bubbles

Increased Corruption and Crime

Deterioration of Business Environment (regulation, laws, etc…)

Not one Latin American country ranks well. Chile has fallen from the elite to second class.

EM Asian countries are all improving, including India. Vietnam is the new Asian Tiger.

A terrible decade for the stock market.

The region suffered a huge hangover from the commodity boom bubble combined with the onslaught of slowing global growth and technological disruption. Emerging markets are a value trade and value has been out of favor because of low growth and worsening fundamentals.

Earnings and valuation started high and have drifted down.

The region has severely underperformed both EM and Asia.

Latin America has become irrelevant as an asset class. It peaked at nearly half the index during the 1990s. It is now 7% and declining.

The region’s sectorial composition looks like a flashback to the 1990s.

 

Tech disruption is the main driver of market performance.

But Latin America trades like a copper stock.

Tech is small but it outperforming.

 

 

Latin American Stocks Are Getting Some Help From Tech

Latin American stocks have performed poorly for the past decade, relative to Global Emerging Markets and even more so compared to the S&P500. The explanation for this sustained period of poor results is threefold:

  1. The global economy has been characterized by enormous technological disruption which is undermining the value of many of the industrial and commercial models of the post W.W. II period. At the same time, demographics and rising debt levels have reduced growth and driven interest rates to historically low levels. These low rates have dramatically favored the valuations of the disruptive tech companies with long-term growth profiles. Unfortunately, the Latin American stock indexes have very few tech companies but rather are very heavily weighted towards the  industries which are being disrupted by newcomers. In this regard, Latin American stocks are similar to the “value” segment of the U.S. market which has also had a decade of weak relative performance.
  2. Measured in U.S. dollars, earnings growth for Latin American publicly trade companies has been negative for the past decade (chart 1). This is because of low GDP growth and technological disruption and also the result of an extensive period of currency weakness (chart 2).
  3. Valuations for Latin American stocks have plummeted (chart 3). As in the case of currencies, public companies were very highly priced 10 years ago. The region was enjoying ample liquidity induced by the commodity super cycle and investors priced in a bountiful future.

Chart 1

Chart 2

The Latin American stock indexes are dominated by financials (32%), materials (21%), consumer staples (14%), energy (13%), communication (6%) and industrials (4%).  All of these sectors are full of legacy business models and traditional companies. Moreover, all of them, except for materials and consumer staples, are under pressure from new entrants empowered by digitalization and artificial intelligence.  The technology-driven sectors (Information technology, internet, eCommerce and healthcare) which drive the S&P500 and the China’s stock market, are very poorly represented in Latin American stock indices.

Nevertheless, this may be changing. Venture capital is flowing into tech startups in Latin America and several of these companies have established success as public companies. Also, some legacy companies are successfully transforming themselves by adopting digital models and have seen their valuations enhanced. If we create an equally-weighted ad hoc index of Latin American tech stocks by adding up the stock market performance of all these companies we can see a strong trend developing (chart 4). Over the past three years, the MSCI Latin American stock index has lost 40% of its value while out Latin American tech index has appreciated by 232%.

The ad-hoc index is made up of eight companies; two from Argentina (Mercado Libre and Globant) and six from Brazil (Via Varejo, Locaweb, B2W, Magazine Luiza, Pagseguro and Stone.) The group is dominated by four eCommerce players (Mercado Libre, B2W, Via Varejo, and Magazine Luiza) who are all active in the highly competitive Brazilian online marketplace space. A second group is active in the fintech payments space (Pagseguro and Stone.) Finally, two companies provide software services : Locaweb is involved in web-hosting and cloud services.; Globant develops software solutions.

 

Brazil’s “Dutch Disease” is Morphing into “Japanification”

 

A defining characteristic of emerging markets is the high economic dependence that many countries have on commodity exports. Unfortunately, this dependence is  a weakness and a major reason for poor economic performance. Financial windfalls and wealth effects triggered by sudden changes in commodity prices or resource discoveries usually lead to boom and bust cycles which bring about negative effects on long-term growth. This has played out repeatedly in emerging markets, most recently with the 2002-2011 commodity “supercycle” and its aftermath.

Venezuela and Nigeria are the most extreme cases of mismanagement of natural resource windfalls,  both having squandered their oil wealth and left behind only misery.  However, almost all developing countries mismanaged the abundant windfalls experienced during the 2002-2011 commodity “supercycle,” leaving their economies in worse shape than before. This recurring phenomenon of mismanagement  of commodity windfalls which undermine long-term growth prospects is known in economics as the “natural resource curse.”

The “natural resource curse” is also known as “Dutch Disease” because the Netherlands suffered a severe drop in competitiveness after discovering vast natural gas reserves in the North Sea. The causes of the “curse” have been extensively covered in the economics literature in recent years.

Frederick van der Ploeg in his 2011 paper “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?” (Link) discusses the literature and provides a framework of analysis which we summarize below. Following this, we look at the specific case of the 2002-2011 commodity boom on Brazil’s development prospects.

The historical evidence points to “Dutch Disease” being a phenomenon of the post-World War  II  period.  Looking further back to the first century of the Industrial Revolution, resource wealth appears to be a main contributor to economic growth and development.  Abundant, cheap and easily accessible coal and iron ore deposits were a key factor for Great Britain’s  early industrial takeoff, as they were for Belgium’s (1830s) and Germany’s (1850s).  The United States’s industrial takeoff after the Civil War also was supported by ample resources of coal and iron ore and later petroleum. Van der Ploeg attributes these early successes of the industrial revolution to a combination of propitious conditions for private initiative and supportive public policies:

  1. Privately-owned mineral rights and attractive conditions for capital.
  2. Strong commitments to education and research and development of leadership in mining and agricultural engineering
  3. Rapid process of linkages with the manufacturing sector.
  4. Particularly in the case of the U.S., persistently high levels of tariff protection.
  5. Highly diversified economies which could absorb shocks to one sector.

In the post-W.W. II period successful development is no longer correlated to resource wealth. The economic miracles of this period occur mostly in resource poor countries, like Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and, most recently, China.  Though  “Dutch Disease” marks the economic development of most commodity producers., there are significant exceptions. Norway, Australia, UAE, Botswana,  Malaysia and Thailand are  examples of commodity-rich countries that found a way to avoid the pitfalls caused by price volatility and boom-to-bust cycles. Van der Ploeg attributes the success of these countries to two primary factors: ( 1) strong institutions; and (2) savings mechanisms to smooth out the financial effects of commodity price changes, such as sovereign funds.

Unfortunately, in emerging markets the successful cases are few. None of the conditions listed above which existed in Europe and the United States in the past are today present in most developing countries. The opposite is true. Most commodity sectors in developing countries are dominated by the state, linkages with manufacturing are difficult to achieve and economies tend to be poorly diversified and rely heavily on  a few commodity exports for their foreign exchange inflows. Moreover, countries have less flexibility to impose high tariff protection as the U.S. did in the past, which inhibits the creation of linkages with mufacturing. Furthermore,  the  past four decades of hyper-financialization of markets and open global capital flows have greatly increased the challenges for policy makers. Finally, Van der Ploeg suggests that fledgling democracies, like those of Latin America, are particularly vulnerable to “Dutch Disease” because institutional development has not kept up with political liberties.

The Causes of “Dutch Disease”

The simple explanation for “Dutch Disease” is that financial windfalls from commodity booms promote rent-seeking behavior which concentrates wealth and political power and buttresses the forces opposed to modernization. According to van der Ploeg, commodity windfalls have the following effects:

  1. They raise the value for politicians to remain in power and increase their resources to “buy off” constituencies. Patronage is increased at the expense of productive activities.
  2. They undermine institutions (justice, press freedom) that oppose corruption and rent-seeking behavior.
  3. They undermine entrepreneurship and productive behavior, as the attractiveness of rent-seeking behavior relative to profit-seeking entrepreneurial activity is increased. Businesses find it more profitable to lobby politicians for protection and exclusive licenses  than to invest in productivity.

These consequences of commodity windfalls appear to be more pervasive for “point-source” resources with concentrated production, such as oil and mining (and much less so for highly diluted activities like farming). Oil and mining in emerging markets tend to be either controlled by the public sector or subjected to heavy licensing and regulatory requirements that increase the influence of politicians.

The Symptoms of “Dutch Disease”

In addition to promoting  corruption and rent-seeking behavior, poorly managed commodity  windfalls beget economic instability. A surge in commodity prices for a country with a high dependence on commodity exports results in a liquidity shock and a sudden improvement in solvency. Currency appreciation accompanied by booms in credit and asset prices follow quickly. The typical economic symptoms of a commodity boom are the following.

  1. Currency appreciation
  2. Deindustrialization; contraction of the traded sector (increased manufacturing trade deficits)
  3. Expansion of non-traded sectors
  4. Increased monetary liquidity and credit expansion
  5. Negative savings
  6. Increased vulnerability to economic instability (debt levels, current account deficits)

Typically, when the commodity boom turns to bust, the country finds itself in a very vulnerable situation. A period of austerity follows, currencies depreciate, credit contracts, and asset prices collapse.

Unfortunately, the boom-to-bust cycle has important negative consequences that may persist for extended periods. The aftermath of the cycle entails:

  1. Weaker long-term growth prospects
  2. Trade sector and its positive externalities (human capital spilllover effects) do not recover fully when the bonanza is over.
  3. Weakened institutions

The Case of Brazil

In 2002 a huge surge in Chinese orders for Brazil’s iron ore giant Vale signaled the beginning of a commodity super-cycle. High prices for iron ore and Brazil’s other commodity exports – coffee, soybeans, sugar, and cocoa – persisted until 2011, with a brief interlude during the great financial crisis. Coincidentally, in 2006 Brazil’s national oil company Petrobras announced the discovery of enormous oil reserves in  pre-salt deep-water oil fields.  This led Petrobras to announce plans to spend $400 billion to raise production from 1.8 million b/d in 2008 to 5.1 million b/d by 2020. Additional plans by Petrobras’s pre-salt partners and independent producers promised to raise output by another 2 million b/d by 2020, so that by that year Brazil, with a production of 7.1 million b/d,  would become the fifth largest producer and exporter in the world. (Oil and gas output for 2020 is now expected to be 3 million b/d)

The combination of a dramatic improvement in Brazil’s terms of trade and the anticipation of a more than tripling of oil output led to a sudden and massive solvency-wealth effect and a financial boom. Unfortunately, the boom did not last, the bust has been dreadful and the long-term consequences for growth appear to have been very negative. Is Brazil suffering a bad case of “Dutch Disease”?  To answer this question, we can study how its experience fits into van de Ploeg’s framework.

Increased Patronage, Corruption and Rent-seeking

The commodity boom unleashed in Brazil a binge of patronage aimed at securing political power.  The ruling  Workers Party  (PT) government beefed up the privileges of the state bureaucracy and introduced myriad welfare programs to cement important electoral constituencies. At the same time, schemes were organized to syphon off funds from state companies and public auctions. Petrobras, the national oil company, became the epicenter of a frenzy of  kickbacks on licenses, procurement contracts and international transactions involving hundreds of politicians and businessmen. Brazil’s largest private contractor, Odebrecht, led a ravenous and pervasive scheme to rig public auctions. Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index” (chart 1) captures well the dramatic expansion in corruption engendered by the commodity boom. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for Brazil, a good measure of the strength of institutions,  show significant declines for all categories. (chart 2)

Chart 1

Chart2 

 

Currency appreciation and deindustrialization.

The Brazilian real (BRL) appreciated sharply over the  2002-2011 period (Chart 3). The BRL bottomed in July 2002 and peaked in September 2011, moving two standard deviations, from very undervalued to very overvalued. This degree of currency volatility would make it difficult for any manufacturer of traded goods to remain competitive and committed to export markets. Consequently, it is not surprising that Brazil has undergone a severe process of premature deindustrialization (chart 4). This process had started during a previous period of currency overvaluation in 1994-1999 and has intensified since 2004 until now. This extreme level of currency volatility is primary evidence of the mismanagement of natural resource windfalls, and it is in stark contrast to the healthy economies of Asia that are committed to maintaining stable and competitive currencies.

Chart 3

Chart 4

Credit Expansion and Asset Appreciation

The commodity boom brought with it a surge of domestic liquidity. Bank lending  to households rose from 7.3% of GDP in 2003 to 18.6% of GDP in 2010 (chart 5). Since the end of the commodity boom in 2011, Brazil’s total debt to GDP has ballooned from 120% GDP to 160% of GDP (chart 6). Public debt to GDP will handily surpass 100% of GDP this year.

Chart 5

Chart 6

The surge in domestic liquidity during the boom years created a huge asset bubble, driving financial assets and real estate prices to record levels. Brazil’s Bovespa stock market index level rose by more than 20 times in U.S dollar terms between September 2002 and August 2008. (Chart 7). The cyclically adjusted price earnings ratio (CAPE) valuation of the stock market reached 34 times, more than triple its historical average. The stock market today is worth less than a third of its value in August 2008 and valuation multiples have returned to historical norms.

Chart 7

 

From Dutch Disease to Japanification

The evidence shows that Brazil clearly has had a bad case of “Dutch Disease.” Sadly, one could argue that the country would be much better off today if the giant pre-salt oil discoveries had never been made. The corruption scandals of the boom led to the fall of a president and the rise of populism, and the weakening of core institutions. A trend of  premature deindustrialization has been accelerated, and the economy is mired in low productivity and low growth. Fixed capital formation is weak and debt has  risen to dangerous levels.

Brazil has entered into a process of Japanification where high debt levels and anaemic growth dynamics make monetary policy ineffective. Brazil is the first major emerging market to join the camp of countries with negative real interest rates, which will have unpredictable consequences.

Even with a much weakened currency, the manufacturing sector is not competitive and continues to decline. Ironically, with low growth and low demand for imports, the Brazilian real is very likely to appreciate in the future. This is because the increase in oil production has dramatically improved Brazil’s structural current account, while the agro-export complex and iron ore exports are more competitive than ever. If the current surge in commodity prices, triggered by Chinese stimulus, persists and a new positive commodity cycle gets underway, the BRL will appreciate and new wave of liquidity will drive the financial economy. This could result in a spurt of artificial growth and asset appreciation and a new dose of Dutch Disease.

 

Capital Flight Into U.S. Residential Real Estate

Over the past decade (2010-2019) foreigners have invested more than a trillion dollars  in American residential real estate. This inflow of “flight capital” into U.S. homes reflects financial and political unease around the world and is a testament to the continued safe-haven status enjoyed by the U.S. These inflows have contributed to the persistent strength in the U.S. dollar over this period.

The National Association of Realtors (NAR)  in the U.S. publishes an annual report on foreign participation in the U.S. residential real estate (Profile of international activity in U.S. Residential Real Estate  Link.)  The chart below details the data for the past decade. According to the NAR, foreigners bought $934 billion in residential properties over the period. Because buyers may frequently not reveal their nationality or/and carry out purchases through legal entities, the NAR figures significantly understate reality. Also, these figures do not include commercial real estate transactions which also were pronounced over the period. Nevertheless, the data can provide some color on the scale and trends of the activity and who the buyers are .

Canada and the UK represent mainly buyers of vacation and retirement homes. The remainder of the primary buyers and the majority of the “others” category represent “flight capital” from a wide variety of emerging markets. These buyers have as their primary objective s to diversify their financial holdings away from their home country and to secure a “safe haven” residence for their families. Chinese buyers have been prominent over the period, particularly between 2014-2018, when capital flight from China was elevated. 2019 saw a large decline in purchases in general and from Chinese buyers in particular. This may be explained by the sharp appreciation of the dollar, the U.S.-China trade tensions and tighter capital controls in China.  The election of the anti-business populist AMLO in Mexico, has triggered a sharp increase in Mexican capital flight into residential properties across the northern border.

The top four destinations for foreign buyers are Florida, California, Texas and Arizona. Canadian “snowbirds”  flock mainly to Florida and Arizona, while the Chinese prefer California, and Mexicans go to Texas and California. Aside from the Mexicans, Latin Americans largely prefer Florida, where they are the dominant buyers in the Miami and Orlando areas and up the eastern coast.

The NRA’s Profile of International Real Estate Investing in Florida 2019 (Link) details Latin American flight capital into Florida. The chart below shows the total purchases by foreigners in the Florida market over the past 10 years in both units and values. Latin Americans represent about 45% of the foreign buyers in Florida, led by Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and Colombia. Mexico and smaller Latin American countries represent about 40% of the “others” line. Mexicans  represent only about 2% of foreign buyers in Florida.

Foreign Buyers of Florida Homes, 2010-2019

The table below details the value of purchases by year. The past decade was turbulent in Latin America with political chaos and economic collapse in Venezuela and stagnation or deep recessions in most countries. The decade also started out with overvalued currencies in most Latin American countries and a depressed real estate market in Florida, which was a combination that favored inflows into Florida’s market. The scale of the flight capital from these savings-poor countries is very concerning, and a clear indication that elites are increasingly estranged and disassociated from the fortunes of their home countries.

Brazil: Deindustrialization, Japanification and Beyond

Brazil’s peripatetic, globetrotting elite brought home the COVID-19 virus.  In late January, a tourist returning from vacation in Lombardy was found to have contracted the virus . Yet, Latam Airlines did not cancel its daily flight from Sao Paolo to Milan until March 2, and thousands more passengers flew  from Milan to Sao Paolo through connecting flights. The viruses first Brazilian victims were treated in Sao Paolo’s world-class private hospitals, and social distancing and sheltering-in-place polices imposed by city governments were readily adhered to in the posh neighborhoods of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Many of these people easily adapted to working online, enjoying relief from the usual traffic jams. Then, the pandemic ran into the reality of Brazil: a vast majority of the population lives day-to-day with no savings, no safety net and in precarious living conditions which are not suited to social distancing.

As elsewhere, in Brazil the pandemic has  worsened what were already fragile conditions.

In Brazil, like in the U.S. where educated coastal elites are more supportive of behavioral restrictions than the less educated and poorer small town and rural inhabitants of the “fly-over” states,  the gap between the “enlightened” elite and the “ignorant” masses has been accentuated. The pandemic has become intertwined with the “class warfare” of contemporary politics. President Jair Bolsonaro has infuriated the elites and the media by taking the side of the masses, a stance that is influenced by an evangelical “come-what-may, God-willing” view of the world.

More importantly, Bolsonaro is deeply worried about his political survival. Abhorred by Brazil’s media and intellectual establishment for his reactionary views on social issues and without broad support in Congress, Bolsonaro had been banking on a vigorous economic recovery this year after five years of recession. Instead, the pandemic is expected to cause Brazil’s worst downturn in a century. Moreover, this latest crisis will leave Brazil’s finances in tatters, seriously undermining its growth path in the future.

Over the past three decades Brazil has already undergone a process of severe, premature de-industrialization. Aside from a buoyant agro-industry, the economy has come to depend heavily on basic services and an increasingly bloated financial sector. Now, the expected increase in government debt may condemn Brazil to a state of “Japanification,” where the economy’s potential growth rate falls well below the level necessary to promote social well-being and political stability.

As the chart below based on BIS data shows, Brazil has increased its debt-to-GDP ratio at a reckless pace in recent years. A combination of recession, fiscal incontinence and extremely high interest rates pursued by the  Central Bank in a bout of radical orthodoxy pushed the ratio from  130% to 163% from 2014 to the end of 2019. This is an already enormous increase, but based on current projections, the ratio may reach 176% by year-end 2020.  All of these increases have come from the expansion of government debt, which by itself  will reach the critically important level of 100% this year.

These are very high levels of debt by any standards, and unsustainable levels for a country with a chronic lack of savings like Brazil. The experience of savings-poor emerging market countries is shown in the chart below. There is no case of a country reaching these levels of debt without having to go through an extended period of deleveraging, either through default, austerity or financial repression.

Unfortunately, almost none of this debt accumulation in Brazil has been or will be directed to investment. Instead, it has served to pay current expenses, pensions and interest payments. The following chart, based on IMF data, shows the extremely low and declining levels of fixed asset investments in Brazil as compared to other “savings-poor” countries.

Fortunately, unlike Argentina or Turkey, most of Brazil’s debt is denominated in local currency, reais (BRL). This means that the default route is unnecessary. In addition, after another lost decade of growth, austerity is not politically viable. Therefore, the only remaining path towards regaining public investment capacity and  to “crowd-in” private investments,  will be some form of financial repression. This will require an extended period of interest rates well below the growth in nominal GDP, which in turn can only be achieved by mandatory credit allocation schemes and some-form of capital controls. The irony is that these policies are anathema to the current finance minister who advocates for the Chicago School free-market policies which were popular in the 1980s and followed with some early success by Chile. Nevertheless, the markets are probably sniffing out that financial repression is unavoidable, as can be seen by the persistent capital flight, shown in the chart below.

Given the chaos of the current triple crisis (health, economic and political), no coherent policy framework can be expected out of Brasilia anytime soon. However, sooner or later a new economic regime will emerge.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Increasing Debt Levels Raise Risks for Emerging Markets

Increasing debt levels are a major source of vulnerability  for  boom-to-bust prone emerging markets. In its latest Global Financial Stability, the IMF highlighted its concerns for rising debt levels in emerging markets, particularly for corporations seeking cheap dollar financing. (Link)

The IMF report points out that external debt ratios have deteriorated to levels that in the past have signaled high risk, as shown in the two charts below. The IMF’s concern is that this funding will dry up when there occurs a shift in global liquidity conditions.

An important measure of vulnerability for emerging market debtors is the recent rate of  debt accumulation. The charts below show  the five and ten-year increase in debt-to-GDP ratios for the primary emerging markets. The first chart shows total debt (public and private), while the second chart shows only private debt. Any increase in total debt/GDP ratios of 5-10% during a mere five years  can be considered to be excessive and a considerable source of risk.  As we can see in the first chart below, China and most of Latin America  have been the worst abusers in the past five years.  This accumulation of debt is bad in itself but made even worse by the use of the debt: in China, mainly for sustaining low-return investments by state firms; in Latin America, to sustain public sector current expenditures and capital flight.

The accumulation of private debt, shown in the second chart, points to several critical stress points: China, Turkey, Korea and Chile.  Chile, which is currently undergoing a severe political crisis that will have an impact on confidence and growth, should be an area of particular concern.

 

30 Years after the Caracazo

Last year millions of ordinary citizens took to the streets in Chile in what was the most disruptive and violent popular protest in Latin America since the “Caracazo” in Venezuela thirty years earlier. As we reflect on these unsettling events, we should not forget that the “big thing in Caracas” led to Hugo Chavez and his catastrophic Bolivarian Revolution.

There are some similarities between the Chile of 2019 and the Caracas of 1989.  Both were seemingly “successful” economies with “stable” democracies, and both had recently benefited from a cycle of high commodity prices that had raised the economic expectations of their citizens. When the inevitable bust occurred and the belt tightening followed, expectations were crushed.  The popular narrative suddenly shifted to a viral rejection of what was now seen as a “rigged” system promoted by corrupt politicians and their crony business elites.

In the Spring of 1989, the “Caracazo” street riots erupted in response to prices increases for gasoline and public transport, a situation similar to the 2019 chaos in Santiago.  After oil prices collapsed in 1986, Venezuela’s economy  tumbled and investors deserted.  In February 1989, a newly-elected president, Carlos Andres Perez (CAP), took office. Though during the campaign CAP had denounced the IMF as “a neutron bomb that kills people, but leaves buildings standing,” he now requested the organization’s support, agreeing to a traditional belt-tightening program. The  Caracazo upheaval paralyzed the country and resulted in hundreds of deaths. More protests persisted into 1990. They were followed by  two coup attempts in 1992 and, shortly after,  the rise of Colonel Hugo Chavez and his “Bolivarian Revolution.”

I lived in Caracas from 1980-1984, working as a journalist and business consultant. This was the tail end of the “OPEC oil boom” and the beginning of the debt crisis that was to result in a “lost decade” for all Latin America. When I lived in Venezuela it appeared to be a stable and functional democracy, with regular alternation of power between the left and the right.  Despite its problems (traffic, corruption of all sorts, and poor public services), Caracas was a delightful place to live and work. Venezuela was a prosperous country with a large and thriving middle class, and it attracted legions of immigrants from Latin America and the rest of the world.  It had a world class oil industry and was a magnet for multinational investments. In the early 1980s, Caracas was the most cosmopolitan city in Latin America, with the best restaurants and lifestyle. Its airport hosted a daily Concord flight to Paris and six daily flights to Miami.

After 25 years of misrule by Chavez and his lieutenant Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela today can only be characterized as a failed state. Its collapsed economy serves only the interests of a small group of kleptocrats.

Venezuela is now ranked 188th in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” survey, with only Eritrea and Somalia considered to be worse.

GDP per Capita has fallen by half since Chavez took power, as the World Bank’s data shows below.

I left Venezuela in 1984 to pursue an MBA. I returned periodically, including in 1996 when Chavez was the leader of the opposition and in 1999 and 2002 when he had already been elected president. On each visit, I made the rounds of business leaders and friends. The message was one of complacent resignation. Most Venezuelans saw Chavez as a temporary problem. This complacency was all that Chavez, with the assistance of his Cuban mentors, needed to entrench himself by gradually undermining democratic institutions and the rule of law.  Chavez was very fortunate that oil prices rose sharply between 2002-2007 which allowed him to fund his nationalizations and social programs and cement his control of the military, the courts and the legislature. By the time Venezuelans realized that Chavez had secured power, it was too late to do anything about it. Millions of Venezuelans, including the most educated and productive, since then have left the country, resettling in Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Miami and Madrid. It is ironic that in the 1970s and early 1980s, Colombians, Chileans and Spaniards had all flocked to Venezuela. Isabel Allende spent her formative years in Caracas, an exile from Chile.

Chavez was clever in securing international support for his experiment, including from prominent foreign leaders and intellectuals. To deceive and disarm his opponents, he tightened the screw in steps, gradually eroding property and democratic rights. The charts below, which come from the World Bank’s Government Indicators, show how freedoms were taken away step-by-step during the course of the Bolivarian Revolution. Today, Rule of Law is near zero on the World Bank’s scale.

Lessons for Chile and Others

What are the lessons to be learned from the Venezuelan catastrophe? Perhaps the only obvious one is that success and stability are precarious. This means that no effort should be spared to strengthen institutions and governance. Also, it should be recognized that in the present environment of slow growth stability will be difficult to maintain unless societies are able to generate more equitable distributions of incomes. Latin America currently fails miserably in providing equal opportunities to all. Entrenched interest groups fight tooth and nail to preserve their privileges.  Matters are complicated by the fact that capital is mostly in the hands of a highly globalized elite which is risk-averse and prefers “safe” assets in the U.S. or Europe. During the slow burn of the Chavez regime, domestic capital deserted, to never return.

 

Explanations for the Middle-Income Trap in Emerging Markets

Only a few middle-income countries have been able to graduate to high-income status, a phenomenon which has been labeled the “middle-income trap.”  We discussed the data on economic convergence in a previous post (link) and now look at the possible explanations for the “middle-income trap.”

The literature on economic convergence and the “middle-income trap” is extensive, as this is a contentious debate in developmental economics. Most economists agree that many middle-income countries find themselves caught between low-wage poor countries that are competitive in mature industries and high-income rich countries that dominate the technologies that drive frontier industries. There is also agreement that for middle-income countries to continue to converge they need to improve institutions, governance and human capital. Moreover, it is widely accepted  that savings-poor middle- income countries suffer from frequent economic slowdowns caused by  unstable cross-border financial flows.  Beyond this consensus, the debate broadly separates commentators into two camps with different policy recommendations:

  • The institutionalists argue that countries are held back by weak institutions, which include rule of law, governance, public sector focus and efficiency, and transparency (democracy and press freedom). The problem for middle-income countries is that the reforms that are necessary to improve the institutional framework may be strongly opposed by entrenched interest groups. The quality of the institutional framework can be described in terms of whether institutions are “extractive” of “inclusive.” (Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail). “Extractive” institutions empower the few at the expense of the public good, and the favored elites resist reforms with tooth and nail. Brazil and Argentina are countries which have stalled because of poor institutions that are structured to benefit narrow interest groups.
  • The Structuralists argue that the key issue that middle-income countries face is the development of innovation capacity. Those middle-income countries that import all their technology or rely on multinational corporations eventually hit a wall (e.g.  Malaysia and Mexico). The question is how does a country promote innovation?  The institutionalists focus on guaranteeing strong intellectual property protection. The structuralist’s  disagree and argue that strong and dirigiste governments are necessary to implement  an industrial policy with incentives/subsidies to attract domestic capital and training programs to upgrade the skills of workers. In order for these interventionist policy initiatives to not turn into boondoggles for crony capitalists, companies must face the discipline of both domestic and international competition.  Therefore, the structuralists argue for trade openness and export-driven growth.

On the surface, the arguments of the institutionalist seem more straight-forward and implementable. For this reason, the standard advice of the IMF and World Bank has relied heavily on promoting institutional reforms that improve governance and the delivery of quality public goods (justice, property rights, healthcare, education, infrastructure). Though these reforms are often blocked by entrenched interests, most newly-elected governments spout a ready-made agenda of improving justice, reducing regulation, cutting bureaucratic waste and improving public services. India’s president Modi famously promised at the beginning of his first administration that he would improve the country’s ranking in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” Index from the high 120s to the 50s, and it appears that he will achieve it.  Brazil, which has made no progress on its “Ease of Doing Business” in 15 years and holds a miserable 124th position, now has a finance minister determined to address this.  However, for those countries with more reasonable rankings (Malaysia,12; Thailand,21; Turkey,33; China, 31) those opportunities are  more limited.

The structuralists argue that improving institutions is necessary but not sufficient, and  only a stop-gap measure for middle-income countries with very poor governance, such as most Latin American countries. Chile is a warning for countries following this simple path: though at one point reaching the 25th position in the “Ease of Doing Business” rankings, it has fallen to 54th  as the domestic consensus for reforms has softened in line with slowing GDP growth and growing social demands.

The nice thing about the arguments made by the structuralists is that they are solidly backed by empirical evidence. In effect, the structuralists look to the “Asian Tiger” model that has worked historically for Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea, and is now espoused by China and Vietnam.

The Asian Tiger model follows a few simple steps:

  • Harness agricultural surplus and forced savings through financial institutions closely controlled by the government and seen to be at the service of nation-building.
  • Manufacturing supported by state-driven industrial policy and credit.
  • Exports supported by competitive currencies
  • Capital controls to Foreign capital “hot money” flows seen as leading to financial instability

China’s “Made in China 2025” industrial plan to achieve competence in ten key high-tech frontier sectors is straight out of the structuralists game-plan. In fact, China has largely followed the “Asian Tiger” model for the past three decades of its accelerated development.

Unfortunately, the future of the Asian Tiger model is unclear. The worse-kept secret about the success of the Asian Tigers is that, either because they were small (Hong Kong, Singapore) or key American strategic geopolitical allies (Japan, Taiwan, Korea) they were allowed to flout the rules, as Washington looked the other way on intellectual property theft and industrial subsidies. Until recently China was also given some leeway, but those days are gone because Washington now sees China as a key strategic rival. The “Trump Doctrine,” which is likely to remain after he leaves office, is that the U.S. will no longer tolerate interventionist policies, particularly if they affect American companies.

Moreover, structuralist policies have a bad name in many countries where attempts to implement them in the past were undermined by incompetence and corruption. For example, Brazil has a tradition of subsidizing and protecting sectors but it has done this without weeding out the underperformers or demanding export competitiveness. The consequence is that in Brazil and many other countries these policies are deeply associated with crony capitalism. Ibid for “financial institutions at the service of nation building,” In most countries these policies are seen as mainly benefiting politicians and their cronies.

Also, for structuralist policies to function countries need strong governments that can pursue initiatives over the long term and stable economies which facilitate long-term planning by public officials and firms. Unfortunately, these are rare attributes. In Latin America we see the opposite of this, with brusque changes of policies with every incoming government and economies prone to repetitive boom-to-bust cycles.

The Case of Emerging Markets

The table below shows the countries that are considered middle-income on the basis of having per capita incomes between 10% and 50% of the per capita income of the United States. EM countries of significance to investors are highlighted in bold and make up the majority of EM countries of importance to investors.


The low-income EM countries (India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Nigeria) should face fewer challenges to  high relative growth and convergence simply because of demographic dividends and technology leapfrogging.

In terms of EM countries, which ones are likely to be middle-income trapped? A few comments on the main countries in EM.

China

China’s future growth path is debatable, with strong views on both sides. On the one hand, the country is assiduously following the path of the Asian Tigers with a keen focus on innovation and human capital. Also, it still benefits from urbanization and the development of backward geographies. On the other hand, rising tensions with the U.S. are leading to trade and technological decoupling which will be a burden. Moreover, a massive debt build-up to finance increasingly unproductive investments is unsustainable. My guess is that, if a financial crisis can be avoided, China’s growth will stabilize around the 3-4% level, still well above expected U.S. growth of 2%

South-East Asian

Thailand and Malaysia are dependent on export, which is a negative in a de-globalizing world. Moreover, they suffer increased competition from new low-cost producers but have very limited innovation capacity of their own.

Europe, Middle-East and Africa

The Eastern European countries have mostly been strong convergers, and Poland is no exception. They still benefit from relatively low costs and opportunities to integrate with Western Europe and have the human capital to participate in high-tech innovation.

Russia’s situation is different, as is it increasingly isolationist. Bad demographics, weak institutions and an overbearing state sector are additional challenges.

Turkey suffers from political and financial instability, a significant brain drain and weakening transparency (democratic and press freedoms).

South Africa appears to be in prolonged decline, with weakening institutions.

Latin America

The region has poor institutions, and political and economic instability, characterized by frequent policy changes and boom-to-bust economies. Innovation capacity is lacking, with the exception of some tech savvy which should be strongly supported by governments. For Latin America, those countries able to improve institutions and business conditions have some upside. Today, it seems Brazil and Colombia are best positioned for this. Mexico is exceptionally placed to take advantage of the current global trade environment but faces declining governance and institutions.

 

For further reading on convergence and the middle-income trap:

“Convergence Success and the Middle-Income Yrap,”  byJong-Wha Lee, ERBD, April 2018 (ERBD)

“Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap,” by Shekk Aariyar ; Romain A Duval ; Damien Puy ; Yiqun Wu ; Longmei Zhang, IMF, March 2013 (Link)

“Middle-Income Traps A Conceptual and Empirical Survey,” by Fernando Gabriel Im and David Rosenblatt, The World Bank, September 2013 (Link)

“Avoiding Middle-Income Growth Traps,” by Pierre-Richard Agénor, Otaviano Canuto, and Michael Jelenic, World Bank, November 2012. (Link)

Economic Convergence and the “Middle-Income Trap.”

Over the long term, the economic performance of countries around the world tends to converge as less developed countries “catch up” to richer ones by adopting existing  technologies and attracting capital which is eager to exploit relatively cheap labor. This convergence has been consistent over time, since the industrial revolution in the 19th century, and has flourished in recent decades, led by the extraordinary progress of China. Nevertheless, a significant number of countries have not participated at all in this process. Also, for many countries, convergence has been moderate and for others  it has plateaued or even regressed.   In particular, a cohort of middle-income countries have stalled in the process of convergence, a phenomenon which as been labelled as the “Middle Income Trap.” It seems that after reaching a certain level of convergence further “catch up” requires new skills, linked to institutions and human capital, which some  countries struggle to develop. This means that for many middle-income countries convergence becomes more arduous, and the result is that, over the past 50 years, only a handful of countries – Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Israel – have successfully graduated to high- income status.

Below, we look  at convergence for the past 50, 30 and 20 years, and follow with a focus on the evidence for the “Middle-Income Trap.”

The Past 50 Years

The table below shows 50-years of convergence based on World Bank data for 92 countries. Convergence is measured by a country’s change in GDP per Capita relative to that of the United States. For example, China’s score of 12.98 indicates that its GDP/Capita relative to the U.S. has gone from 1.1% to 14.2% over the 50-year period. Countries that are significant for emerging markets investors are highlighted in bold.

  • The top performers are very diverse, covering every region and population size, though Asian convergence is very strong.
  • Only half the countries enjoyed any convergence at all. Significant underperformers generally fall under two categories: 1. Countries which are categorized by the WB as pre-demographic dividend, meaning that they experienced high population growth and increasing dependency ratios; 2. Countries suffering political turmoil (civil strife, wars,etc…) or extreme political dysfunction (Argentina, Venezuela).
  • Focusing on those countries that matter for EM investors, eight important EM countries experienced significant convergence (China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Turkey and Chile). Taiwan would also qualify but is not included in WB data. Three countries (Colombia, Brazil, Philippines) experienced either slight convergence or slight regression. Six countries experienced significant regression (Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa, Venezuela). About half of the countries that investors follow closely in emerging markets over this long period have not enjoyed significant convergence.

The Past 30 Years

The World Bank data for the past 30 years (1988-2018) covers 150 countries. These years cover the modern period of institutional investment in emerging market stocks, as the widely-used EM indices (MSCI, IFC/S&P, FTSE) were launched in the second half of the 1980s, and many institutional investors began allocating to emerging markets in the early 1990s.

  • Once again, the best performers – those countries converging the most with the GDP/Capita of the U.S. – come from a broad variety of geographies and income groups. Asian convergence is exceptional.
  • Well over half the countries experienced positive convergence with the U.S.
  • Several new impressive convergers appear from emerging Asia (Myanmar, Vietnam, Bhutan Laos) and Africa (Equatorial Guinea,Cabo Verde, Mozambique).
  • The performance of significant countries for EM investors diverges greatly over this period. Asian markets all experience rapid convergence (China, India, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Philippines), with the exception of Pakistan, which makes only slight progress. In Latin America, Chile enjoys strong gains and Peru and Colombia achieve significant positive convergence, but Argentina, Mexico and Brazil all lose ground and Venezuela experiences a collapse, moving from middle-income to low-income status. In Africa, Nigeria achieves moderate convergence, while South Africa suffers a severe deterioration.

The Past 20 Years

The past two decades saw a commodity boom and peak globalization characterized by the extensive development of global supply chains by multinational corporations. Most importantly, the incorporation of the formerly “Soviet Bloc” countries  had a big impact on the World Bank data for convergence, as these economies have enjoyed rapid progress by attracting capital and integrating into the global economy.

  • Nearly 70% of economies experience convergence over this period.
  • Once again, the best performers came from a wide variety of geographies and income groups. Formerly Soviet bloc countries dominate the list (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Georgia, etc…). In Africa, Ethiopia appears as a top performer, and, in Asia, Cambodia now arrives.
  • Looking a the countries of significance to EM investors, Asia performs well across-the-board; In Eastern Europe, the Middle-East and Africa (EMEA), Poland, Russia, Turkey and Nigeria experience strong convergence, while South Africa languishes; in Latin America, Peru and Colombia perform reasonably well, while Brazil and Mexico slip, Argentina slides and Venezuela crashes.

Evidence for the Middle Income Trap

In the table below, we look at the performance of middle-income countries over the past 30 years (1988-2018). We use a broad definition of middle-income, including countries having incomes which vary from 10% to 50% of the per capital income of the United States at the beginning of the period. 40 countries are included, which represents 27% of the WB database.

  • Half of the middle-income countries experience at least some convergence. The number of strong convergers is roughly the same as the number of underperformers. On average, convergence is low for this group. There are also about an equal number of big winners and big losers, with Hong Kong, Malta and Korea graduating to upper- income status, and Venezuela, Ukraine and Georgia falling out of middle-income status.
  • Neither geography nor relative income seems to determine either winners or losers. Nevertheless, there is a strong contrast between the high conversions of Asian middle-income countries (Korea, Malaysia) and weak performance of Latin American countries. To some extent, we can conclude that the “Middle-Income Trap” is largely a Latin American phenomenon.

Conclusion

The world has experienced significant economic convergence in recent decades, as expected by economic theory.

However, middle-income countries as a whole have had mediocre performance which is not explained by geography or relative income.

What is it that explains the great divergence within middle-income countries? Why have Korea and Chile prospered while Venezuela has collapsed and Brazil has languished? This is a key debate which we will explore in a future post.

The Chilean Riots and the Privatization of Public Goods

The recent riots in Chile, triggered by a small increase in the subway fare, have highlighted the politically explosiveness of the pricing of “public goods,” particularly in societies with high wealth concentration.

The root cause of the Chilean riots appears to be a strong  conviction held by the main population that the  “system”  is rigged in favor of the elites and  will not provide the most basic public goods necessary for anyone to have a fair shake at improving one’s lot.

For a major metropolitan area like Santiago this means an efficient subway system to transport the less-well-off from the distant suburbs to the jobs in the prosperous city center.  The Santiago Metro does this pretty well.  But, ironically, having a good subway system causes new issues, such as making the poor much more aware of wealth disparities, and making them highly dependent on continued access to maintain their jobs. Apparently, even small increases in fares can be very unsettling for workers and students living in precarious situations.

This raises the question of what role the government should play in providing public goods and how to pay for them.  This is a huge dilemma everywhere but especially in Latin America where government finances have historically been poorly managed and debt levels are high. Over the past decades, governments have pretended they could dismiss the problem by turning to privatization and “high finance”: public companies financed in the bond market and concessions. This is the case, for example of the Santiago Metro, which is a corporation with close ties to the Chilean capital markets.

This abdication of the responsibility for investment in public goods has increasingly become the norm in many Latin American countries where most infrastructure (airports, highways,etc…) has been turned over to the private sector. Increasingly, this also applies to healthcare and higher education, where dysfunctional public institutions are hopeless.

The current government in Brazil is pursuing the most pro-markets policies that the country has seen since the 1960s. The finance minister, Paulo Guedes, would like to privatize and deregulate everything as fast as possible, hoping to spark an entrepreneurial revolution in the country.

But, this is the same country which was paralyzed by a truckers’s strike in 2018, in response to diesel and toll prices. President Bolsonaro’s honeymoon is over now, and as we have seen in Argentina, Chile, Hong Kong and elsewhere, patience is running thin.